Examining a Sustainable Approach to Global Climate Change Policy by Clark, Susan Spierre (Author) et al.
 Examining a Sustainable Approach to Global Climate Change Policy 
by 
Susan Spierre Clark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2013 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Thomas Seager, Chair 
Sonja Klinsky 
Braden Allenby 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2013 
i 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
recognizes development as a priority for carbon dioxide (CO2) allocation, under its 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This was codified in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which exempt developing nations from binding emission reduction targets. 
Additionally, they could be the recipients of financed sustainable development projects in 
exchange for emission reduction credits that the developed nations could use to comply 
with emission targets. Due to ineffective results, post-Kyoto policy discussions indicate a 
transition towards mitigation commitments from major developed and developing 
emitters, likely supplemented by market-based mechanisms to reduce mitigation 
costs.  Although the likelihood of achieving substantial emission reductions is increased 
by the new plan, there is a paucity of consideration to how an ethic of development might 
be advanced. Therefore, this research empirically investigates the role that CO2 plays in 
advancing human development (in terms of the Human Development Index or HDI) over 
the 1990 to 2010 time period. Based on empirical evidence, a theoretical CO2-
development framework is established, which provides a basis for designing a novel 
policy proposal that integrates mitigation efforts with human development objectives.  
Empirical evidence confirms that CO2 and HDI are highly correlated, but that 
there are diminishing returns to HDI as per capita CO2 emissions increase. An 
examination of development pathways reveals that as nations develop, their trajectories 
generally become less coupled with CO2. Moreover, the developing countries with the 
greatest gains in HDI are also nations that have, or are in the process of moving toward, 
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outward-oriented trade policies that involve increased domestic capabilities for product 
manufacture and export.  
With these findings in mind, future emission targets should reduce current 
emissions in developed nations and allow room for HDI growth in developing countries 
as well as in the least developed nations of the world. Emission trading should also be 
limited to nations with similar HDI levels to protect less-developed nations from unfair 
competition for capacity building resources. Lastly, developed countries should be 
incentivized to invest in joint production ventures within the LDCs to build capacity for 
self-reliant and sustainable development over the long-term. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION:  
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change is a complex phenomenon. Emissions of greenhouse-gases 
(GHGs) from any geographical location on the Earth’s surface travel to the upper 
atmosphere and play a role in affecting climate globally. Hence, the impact of any 
particular emission of GHGs is not realized solely at its source, either individual or 
geographical; rather impacts are dispersed to other actors and regions of the Earth. GHGs 
are also temporally diffuse, some having atmospheric lifetimes on the order of tens of 
thousands of years. Consequently, GHG emissions are responsible for a myriad of 
impacts including changes to Earth's climate system, manifested in events such as 
drought, floods, sea-level rise, temperature changes, extinction of species, and spread of 
vector-borne diseases.  
In failing to cooperate and limit overall emissions, the current generation does not 
simply pass along an existing problem to future people, rather it adds to it, making the 
problem even more severe. For example, waiting to act increases the magnitude of future 
climate change, increases mitigation costs, and allows additional investment in fossil fuel 
based infrastructure in developed and especially less developed countries (Gardiner, 
2006). Furthermore, the current generation does not add to the problem in a linear 
fashion. Instead, it is rapidly accelerates the climate change problem, since global 
emissions are increasing at an exponential rate (Hofmann, Butler, & Tans, 2009). Figure 
1 illustrates how the net global climate response becomes increasingly more severe as 
CO2 levels, and the associated global temperature change, continue to increase. 
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Moreover, it remains unclear if/when human forcing will cause the climate system to 
cross thresholds, associated with potentially large, abrupt, and possibly irreversible 
changes to the world as we know it (Alley et al., 2003). Therefore, there is an urgent need 
for effective and sustainable methods of mitigating GHG emissions to stabilize the 
climate system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Addressing the problem of climate change is just as complex because it involves 
questioning the norms of how our society currently functions. Defining society’s norms is 
in itself a challenge because it varies depending on the values of the discipline employed.  
Figure 1. The exponential climate change damage function shows escalating damages to 
ecosystem service as the concentration of CO2 increases in the atmosphere. The example 
temperature changes and damages are adapted from the IPCC 2007 report. Note that the 
specific link between atmospheric CO2 concentration and specific damages remains 
unclear. 
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The traditional approach to climate policy, and other environmental issues, appeals to 
issues of economic productivity, for instance focusing on GDP losses as a result of a 
warmer world (Tol, 2009).  When social impacts are considered, they are integrated into 
analysis by placing an estimated monetary value on non-market goods (e.g., human 
health impacts) so that they may be internalized by the market. Thus, the familiar 
approach to climate policy design is to reduce GHG mitigation costs for developed 
nations through market-based mechanisms (i.e., emissions trading or carbon tax). This 
enables an economically efficient allocation of emissions, since parties that can make 
significant reductions inexpensively will, and those that find reductions too expensive 
will instead pay for their right to emit. However, this approach fails to adequately address 
the social implications of the problem.  That is, there are fundamental ethical 
considerations needed to adequately address both the intergenerational and 
intragenerational aspects of climate change. For instance, where the global limit of GHG 
concentration is set depends on how the interests of the current generation are weighed 
against those of future generations. Also, how emissions are distributed under the global 
cap depends in part on various beliefs about the appropriate role of energy consumption 
in people’s lives, the importance of historical responsibility for the problem, and the 
current needs and future aspirations of particular societies. Consequently, addressing 
climate change through the lens of a single discipline may create unintended 
consequences in another. 
Alternatively, this research frames global climate change as a sustainability 
problem. The most common (but not universally agreed upon) definition of sustainability 
is associated with the concept of sustainable development or ‘development that meets the 
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needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’ (Bruntland, 1987). Implicit in this definition is the notion that the natural 
environment will not be able to indefinitely meet escalating human demands. As shown 
in Figure 1, the climate system cannot absorb an infinite amount of GHG emissions and 
maintain the ecosystem services on which society depend. Thus, addressing sustainability 
problems implies understanding the interdependencies between natural and human 
systems, which necessitates an interdisciplinary perspective of the issue. Therefore, to 
examine a sustainable approach to global climate policy, this research is concerned with 
more than the environmental objective of limiting GHG emissions at minimum economic 
costs, but also integrates non-monetized social indicators to account for the implications 
of climate policy on the human experience.  
With these overarching concepts in mind, this dissertation is organized in the 
following way: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the current debates surrounding 
international approaches to climate policy, which reveals a lack of attention to the 
implications of global climate policy on development around the world. Based on this 
overview, the specific objectives and hypothesis motivating this research are provided. In 
Chapter 3, the independent and dependent variables utilized in this work are discussed. 
Specifically, indicators of consumption-based CO2 emissions and human development (in 
terms of the Human Development Index or HDI) are employed at the country level. The 
reasons for focusing on these particular indicators are also revealed. Next, Chapter 4 
begins investigating the relationship between CO2 and human development, beginning 
with a sensitivity analysis of the 2010 HDI methodology and the examination of 
development pathways over time. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the implications of 
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traded CO2 (embodied in traded goods and services) for climate policy design. Using the 
results from previous chapters (and evidence from other studies), Chapter 6 establishes a 
theoretical framework for understanding the CO2-development relationship, which serves 
as a basis for critiquing unrestricted market-based strategies for GHG mitigation. Chapter 
6 also provides a novel climate policy proposal geared to prevent unintended 
development consequences. Additionally, Appendix A examines how students make 
decisions about common-pool resources when confronted with a collective action 
problem, which is simulated by game-theoretic tensions. Although not directly related to 
the other chapters, the goal is to examine potential models of cooperation that may 
alleviate some of barriers to sustainable decision-making among diverse groups of 
stakeholders. 
Note that this is a multipaper dissertation, meaning that Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
Appendix A are structured for inclusion in peer-reviewed journal articles. At the time that 
this dissertation was written, Chapter 4 had already been accepted by the Journal of 
Sustainable Development, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 were ready to submit for review, and 
Appendix A remained under review by Ethics, Policy, and Environment.  All co-authors 
(Thomas P. Seager, Evan Selinger, and Jathan Sadowski) have given the author 
permission to include these manuscripts in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
 THE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY DEBATE 
I begin by reviewing the current state of global climate policy by outlining the 
terms of the Kyoto Protocol and highlighting the current debates related to designing 
Kyoto’s predecessor. Building on the major concerns of diverse negotiating groups, I 
offer and describe three major objectives of future climate policy that will promote wide 
participation. This provides a basis for identifying the particular knowledge gap that my 
research seeks to clarify, which enables me to define specific research questions that I 
will investigate in forthcoming chapters. 
Current State of International Climate Policy 
The Kyoto Protocol 
The major international attempt at addressing the problem of climate change 
began in 1992 with the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is aimed at stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentrations in the atmosphere to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system’. The treaty established the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities as one of the fundamental principles in global climate change 
cooperation. This principle recognizes historical differences in the contributions of 
developed and developing regions to global environmental problems, and differences in 
their respective economic and technical capacity to tackle these problems. This is 
codified by the Kyoto Protocol, which set binding greenhouse gases emissions reduction 
targets for major developed countries (Annex I nations) to collectively reduce emissions 
on average by 5.2% relative to 1990 during the period of 2008－2012. The Protocol 
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includes three flexible mechanisms that help developed nations meet their emission 
reduction targets. These include permit trading between developed nations, clean 
development mechanisms (CDMs), and joint implementation (JI). The CDM involves 
developed countries investing in sustainable development projects that reduce emissions 
in developing countries, whereas the JI allows developed nations to work with other 
developed nations towards this effort.  Kyoto was recently extended for a second 
commitment period from 2013 to 2020, which requires GHG emission reductions by at 
least 18% below 1990 levels by Annex I Parties (note that the Parties involved in the 
second commitment period are different from the first and are referred to as Annex B 
nations).  
The overall consensus is that Kyoto, although an important first step, has been 
ineffective at addressing climate change. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion have 
grown 41% since 1990 and although emissions generated in developed countries have 
generally stabilized, emissions produced in the exempt developing countries have 
doubled (Le Quéré et al., 2009). Also, the UNFCCC recognizes development as a priority 
in its commitment to ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, yet the major finding 
of a review article in Climate Change finds that the market-based CDM does not 
significantly contribute to sustainable development in developing countries, since 
sustainable benefits are not monetized and therefore do not drive investments (Olsen, 
2007). Kyoto has also been criticized for its priority of cost-effectiveness, which shifts 
the focus of negotiations away from ethical issues (Victor, 2001; Brown, 2002; Gardiner, 
2004).  
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Post-Kyoto Policy Negotiations 
As Kyoto approaches expiration, international climate discussions have turned to 
designing the next climate change policy regime to be implemented in 2020. In 2011, the 
Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action with the 
objective of developing “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force under the Convention and applicable to all Parties” by 2015 and to be fully 
implemented in 2020 (UNFCCC, 2011). The Durban Platform addresses the demands of 
the European Union, backed by small-island and least developed countries, to negotiate a 
new legally-binding system that engages all countries and allows for a more 
‘symmetrical’ response among nations, the primary concern of the U.S. in future climate 
policy. At the same time, the Durban Platform allowed for an extension of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which was the main demand of the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, 
and China) since it prevents legally binding reductions in developing nations until at least 
2020. However, the objectives of the small-island and least developed countries (the 
countries most vulnerable to climate change impacts), related to an urgent increase of 
ambition by all Parties, was arguably not addressed by the Durban Platform, which does 
not specify a time period for enhanced action (Bodansky, 2012). 
Still, many of the details of the post-Kyoto policy regime have yet to be 
negotiated, and various like-minded country groupings have expressed conflicting 
perspectives on future policy design. For example, the Group of Eight (G8), which 
includes France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada 
and Russia, called for a global reduction of GHG emissions by 50% by 2050, including a 
reduction of 80% by developed countries. The G8 leaders agreed that mitigation efforts 
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by all countries were critical to tackle climate change: developed nations would be 
responsible for significant emission reductions, and the developing countries would 
undertake actions to deviate from business as usual emissions (G8, 2009).  On the other 
hand the BASIC group calls for a framework entitled “Equitable Access to Sustainable 
Development”, which is a resource-sharing approach that determines a global carbon 
budget (e.g., from 1850 to 2049) which is then divided on an equal per capita basis 
determined by the global population in a given base year. The remaining entitlements for 
each nation are then estimated by subtracting its historical emissions from its total 
entitlements (BASIC expert group, 2011).  The Least Developed Countries (LDCs), made 
up of 49 countries characterized as having low income, weak human assets and high 
economic vulnerability, also convey their desire for principles of equity to be maintained 
in post-Kyoto policy.  The latest LDC submission to the UNFCCC expresses concern for 
flexible options and/or voluntary approaches to mitigation for nations in their group, as 
well as the inclusion of finance, capacity building, and technological development and 
transfer mechanisms (LDC Submission, 2013). Despite having distinct priorities, the G8, 
BASIC, and LDCs all express concern for the cost of mitigation and generally support 
the use of market-based mechanisms to efficiently distribute emission rights after initial 
allocation is accomplished. For example, the BASIC group explicitly calls for an 
emission trading scheme that allows financial transfers from developed to developing 
nations. Surprisingly, there is also a common call for a system that includes all Parties to 
the Convention post-Kyoto, recognized as a critical component for an effective policy 
regime. All of these perspectives and priorities will no doubt be debated at the 19
th
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Session of the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, to be held in Warsaw, Poland this 
November. 
Objectives of the Durban Platform 
From the previous discussion that highlights the current state of policy and 
debates occurring at the international level, it is possible to simplify the objectives of the 
Durban Platform negotiations (that are likely needed for broad support) into three main 
categories: 1) effectively reducing GHG emissions globally, 2) minimizing the economic 
costs of emission reductions, and 3) achieving numbers 1 & 2 while maintaining common 
principles of climate justice. This section will briefly discuss the concepts underlying 
these three goals, as discussed in the literature.   
Reducing GHG Emissions 
 The UNFCCC ultimate objective is to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs at levels that would prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ (UNFCCC, 1998), achieved through overall reductions in GHG 
emissions. According to the UNFCCC, the reductions necessary to meet this objective 
includes an agreement on the target for allowable temperature increase (e.g., limit 
warming to 2ºC), the associated concentration levels needed to keep warming below the 
allowable temperature (e.g., 450 parts per million CO2), and an emission pathway to 
achieve that concentration level (UNFCCC, 1992). As Bodansky (2012) points out, the 
last two factors remain unclear. The scientific link between temperature change and 
atmospheric concentrations is not fully understood, although the 2007 IPCC report 
estimates a 2ºC temperature increase is associated with about 350 parts per million CO2 
(a level we have already passed) based on current understanding of the climate system 
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response to radiative forcing and feedback mechanisms. Also, the sought emission 
pathway for society is coupled with many other factors, including mitigation costs and 
issues of climate justice. Scott and Barret (2003) argue that a policy’s emission reduction 
effectiveness is a function of strong commitments, levels of participation, and 
compliance. Therefore, more stringent requirements may be necessary to increase 
emission reductions but they will fail to achieve these reductions if they promote low 
levels of participation and/or compliance. Thus, a delicate balance is needed to maintain 
all three factors for effective GHG reductions at the global level. Participation and 
compliance issues are also tied to costs and the perceptions of fairness, which are 
discussed next. 
Minimizing Mitigation Costs 
 Climate policy geared toward minimizing mitigation costs seeks to maximize net 
benefits over time, so reducing emissions makes sense only if the benefits of doing so are 
greater than the costs. This analysis is accomplished through cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
where benefits and costs are conveyed in terms of monetary value and are adjusted over 
time using discount rates, which convert future costs and benefits (assumed to be worth 
less than today) into their net present value. Thus, if the net benefits are positive the 
policy being analyzed promotes economic efficiency (Kotchen, 2010). However, when 
applied to climate policy, CBA becomes controversial because reducing emissions 
involves non-market goods that are difficult to value in terms of money, such as the 
extinction of a species or the melting of the ice caps. Also, the unknown time horizons of 
climate change impacts and the choice of discount rates can greatly influence the results. 
For example, benefits occurring far in the future count much less against costs that must 
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be incurred over the short-term (see Tol, 2009 for a discussion about the limitations of 
CBA to climate change).  
CBA can also be used to estimate a price of a unit of carbon, which internalizes 
the externalities associated with CO2 emissions (e.g., health impacts and agricultural 
setbacks). Carbon pricing can promote cost-effective CO2 emission mitigation through 
market-based mechanisms, such as a tax and/or emission trading (Aldy & Stavins, 2011).  
In terms of CO2 emissions, pursuing the objective of minimizing global mitigation costs 
allocates emissions to those that produce the most economic output with the least 
emissions (e.g., units of GHG emissions produced per dollar GDP). There is wide support 
for the use of market-based mechanisms across the negotiating groups to reduce 
mitigation costs, the G8 and the BASIC groups explicitly call for an emissions trading 
scheme after obligations are determined.   
Concepts of Climate Justice 
A wealth of literature exists that discuss ideal methods of emission allocates based 
on varying perspectives of distributive justice. For example, Klinksy and Dowlatabadi 
(2009) offer a comprehensive list of international climate policy prescriptions, organized 
by their distribution rules and how they define the climate change problem. Although a 
complete synthesis of approaches is beyond the scope of this work, the aim is to discuss 
the details surrounding the justice issues most central to the current policy debates, 
including the ‘polluter pays’ principle, equal entitlement to the atmosphere, and 
development-equity. Approaches based on these major equity principles share the notion 
that future climate policy should advantage the developing and least developed nations of 
the world. 
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Polluter Pays. This strategy has considerable intuitive appeal because it focuses 
on the notion that those who cause a problem are morally responsible for solving it. The 
principle however becomes somewhat nebulous in the context of global climate change, 
since it is impossible to link specific costs to a particular activity or actor (Caney, 2005). 
The common remedy is to associate the current generation with their ancestors, from 
whom they have inherited benefits of industrial activity (Shue, 1999; Neumayer, 2000). 
Also, the ‘polluter pays’ principle may be used to assign responsibility to different 
polluters depending on the time frame examined. For example, Kyoto operationalizes this 
principle because it requires emission reductions only by member developed nations 
based on emissions in 1990. For the Durban Platform, the BASIC group considers using 
cumulative emissions to assign national entitlements to emission rights from 1850 (the 
start of the industrial revolution) and 1970 (when society began to understand the impacts 
of GHG emissions), in both cases responsibility for emissions is carried on the shoulders 
of developed nations (BASIC expert group, 2011).  
Equal Entitlements. The idea that climate policy should distribute rights on an 
equal per capita basis is reverberated in the policy and ethics literature (e.g., Jamieson, 
2001; Singer, 2002; Agarwal & Narain, 1991). In general, it requires scientific agreement 
on the total amount of GHG emissions we can continue to allow, divided by the total 
world population. Each country, then, would be allowed to emit the sum of their 
population (indexed to a baseline year) times the allowable emissions per person. The 
BASIC group includes an equal per capita allocation in their proposal reasoning that this 
approach to equity recognizes the need for greater emission entitlements for larger 
nations. An equal per capita emission allocation would also advantage the developing 
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nations, and is therefore viewed as way to allocate resources to the least well-off (Traxler, 
2002). This approach is criticized for its lack of consideration for the differentiating role 
that emissions play in peoples’ lives (Gardiner, 2004; Shue 1993).  
Development Equity. From this perspective, priority should be given to those 
who are worst-off or least advantaged. In the context of climate change, the principle 
suggests that the most vulnerable populations (which are also the least developed nations) 
should not be expected to pay for costs associated with climate change (Shue, 1999; 
Lomborg, 2001; Gardiner 2004). This principle does not necessarily compete with the 
‘polluter pays’ principle, but does suggest that it should be supplemented with an 
additional principle that poor polluting countries should not pay, even if they are to blame 
for some emissions (Caney, 2005). Allocation based on development equity suggests that 
the developed countries should take the lead in mitigation because mitigation efforts in 
underdeveloped countries would unfairly inhibit their development process, a process 
that was unrestricted to already industrialized nations. This principle is often addressed 
through mechanisms that transfer resources to developing countries (e.g., Schelling, 
1998; Aldy, Orszag, & Stiglitz, 2001; Baumert and Goldberg, 2006). The Kyoto Protocol 
also operationalizes this approach by exempting developing nations from emission 
reduction targets. The LDCs, in particular, call for need-based considerations of 
mitigation policy, that takes into account the capacities and circumstances of the most 
vulnerable nations (LDC Submission, 2013).  
Knowledge Gap 
From this review, it is clear that the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to 
effectively reduce GHG emissions globally, but achieving this goal depends on the ability 
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of future climate policy to also minimize CO2 mitigation costs and promote common 
appeals to equity concerns, as indicated by negotiating groups. If emission reduction 
targets are  implemented in countries at all development levels, as the Durban Platform 
and post-Kyoto policy discussions indicate, the likelihood of achieving significant 
mitigation is greatly increased, but it remains unclear how major equity concerns will be 
addressed. Furthermore, the default mechanism for reducing mitigation costs at the 
international level is a CO2 permit market, yet the implications of market-based 
mitigation mechanisms on underdeveloped nations have yet to be understood.  For one, 
the use of CO2 emissions trading has been limited to developed nations so far (i.e., the 
European Union Trading System and other GHG emission markets in New Zealand, 
Australia, and the U.S.). Plus, all existing carbon trading schemes grant the largest 
amount of emission rights to biggest polluters (i.e., countries, firms, power plants) that 
are most responsible for the pollution in the first place (Gilbertson & Reyes, 2009). This 
would at least partially negate attempts to assign emission rights based on a ‘polluter 
pays’ principle and/or development equity. Therefore, not only are the implications of 
emissions trading on developing nations unknown, but an unlimited CO2 permit market 
may undermine the core equity principles advanced primarily by the developing 
countries (BASIC group) and least developed nations (LDCs) of the world.   
Research Objectives 
With the above considerations in mind, this research seeks to understand the 
ethical implications of emission restrictions and an unlimited CO2 permit market on 
international socio-economic development. To investigate, I examine the role that CO2 
plays in human development, and if significant, how that role may be integrated into 
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post-Kyoto mitigation policy. Therefore the principle hypotheses motivating this research 
are: 
 The diminishing returns to the 2010 United Nation’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) with respect to energy and CO2 emissions are independent of the 
normalization method employed (chapter 4), 
 Nations that are primarily carbon exporters experience greater improvement in 
HDI over time compared to countries that are primarily carbon-importers (chapter 
5), 
 Current market-based mitigation methods will result in perverse human 
development outcomes (chapter 6). 
The next chapter outlines the specific methodology I employ to investigate these 
hypothesis. 
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Chapter 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Nation-State Scale of Analysis 
As stated in Chapter 2, this research is framed to inform global climate policy. In 
particular, the relationship between CO2 and human development is investigated with the 
intent to better integrate development equity objectives into post-Kyoto policy design. 
Consequently, the methods employed and the partitioning of results are at the nation-state 
scale, which is applicable for use within the UNFCCC policy structure (the only existing 
international governing body to date). Note however that this research does consider 
transfers of emissions between nations to account for the increasing trans-boundary flows 
of emissions in the globalized market.  
Logistically, the state level provides the most data availability for both GHG 
emission inventories and human development indicators. For example, the Millennium 
Development Goals (ranging from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of 
HIV/AIDs) use indicators at the national levels to assess progress. Furthermore, due to 
the inability to directly link specific costs from climate change to particular actors, 
addressing the problem at alternative scales becomes morally problematic. As a few 
authors point out, it remains unclear who the appropriate moral agents are in climate 
change (Caney, 2005; Klinsky &  Dowlatabadi, 2009). For example, in the case of a 
carbon-intensive industry that releases a high level of CO2, it is impossible to pick out a 
specific individual or localized cost resulting from those particular emissions. Thus, in 
determining responsibility for the impacts of climate change, many authors revert to the 
country-level unit of analysis, which allows an indirect link between the actions of a 
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particular group and their collective pollution (Shue 1999, Neumayer, 2000). That is not 
to say that the nation-state is the only or the best scale for climate mitigation efforts.  
 The literature provides examples of alternative scales of mitigation efforts. For 
example, Ostrom (2009) argues that policies adopted at the global scale are unlikely to 
generate enough trust among citizens and firms to facilitate collective action, and 
promotes a polycentric approach by small to medium scale governance units linked via 
information networks. Also, Lutsey and Sperling (2008) discuss many of the sub-national 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions within the U.S., such as energy efficiency funding, 
renewable fuel requirements, and regulatory standards, that are distinct from the relative 
inaction at the national level. Additionally, the role of the state (in terms of authority and 
power) has come under scrutiny as a result of ‘globalization’, or the increasing 
integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows 
(IMF, 2000). Some argue that globalization is creating a borderless world in which global 
companies are the primary actors (Ohmae, 1990, 1995; Strange, 1996), others maintain 
that states are the major actors in international politics and economics (Hirst & 
Thompson, 1996; Pauly & Reich, 1997). The collection of articles edited by Higgott, 
Underhill, and Bieler (2000) demonstrate that the role of the state has not diminished, but 
has changed due to the increasing capabilities of non-state actors, especially private 
corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nevertheless, it is clear that 
including non-state actors in current and future climate management initiatives is likely 
critical for achieving climate stabilization. Thus, the focus of this research on a nation-
based metric is not intended to downplay the importance of action at these alternative 
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scales, but aimed at informing the scale most applicable to current international policy 
discussions. 
Measuring GHG Emissions 
Under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) accounting rules 
(which informs UNFCCC policy), mitigation only applies to “greenhouse gas emissions 
and removals taking place within national territory and offshore areas over which the 
country has jurisdiction”, also known as a country’s territorial emissions (IPCC, 2008). 
However, recent studies emphasize the criticality of life-cycle considerations in climate 
policy design, due to the increasing trend of international trade flows of CO2 in the global 
economy (Carbon Trust, 2006, 2011; Peters & Hertwich, 2008; Weber & Matthews, 
2007; Davis & Caldeira, 2010; Wiebe, Bruckner, Giljum, & Lutz, 2010;  Davis, Peters, & 
Caldeira, 2011; Nakano et al., 2009; Peters et al. 2009; Peters, Minx, Weber & 
Edenhofer, 2011; Peters, Davis & Andrew, 2012).  The basic idea is that in today’s 
globalized economy, goods and services consumed in one country are often produced in 
another country. Known as consumption-based emission inventories, emissions generated 
during the production of goods and services are attributed to the consuming nation. 
Unlike territorial based emission accounting (that do not take trade into account), 
consumption-based inventories show that most developed countries have significantly 
increased their GHG emissions since 1990, despite their Kyoto commitments, through the 
consumption of goods and services produced in developing nations (Peters et al., 2011). 
They also result in higher correlations with human development indicators (i.e., life 
expectancy, income, literacy, & HDI) when compared to territorial emission accounting 
(Steinberger et al., 2012). That is, shifting from territorial to consumption-based 
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emissions results in countries moving closer to the regression curve (Figure 2); in 
general, developed nations (or net importers) move right and many developing countries 
(net exporters) tend to shift left on the graph. Additionally, a change in emission 
allocation changes the rank of countries. For example, production-based inventories 
indicate that China is first and the U.S. is second in terms of total emissions generated, 
but these positions are swapped using a consumption-based perspective since the U.S. is 
a net importer and China is a net exporter. The results are useful to understand the drivers 
of GHG emissions, the distribution of final goods and services, as well as the benefit 
gained by consumers from the embodied emissions of products, both reasons why we 
employ consumption-based emission data in this research. 
Peters, Mix, Weber, and Edenhofer (2011) provide us with a consumption-based 
emission data-set that considers emission transfers between nations via international trade 
from 1990 to 2010. The data-set uses territorial emission inventories (from Boden, 
Marland, & Andres, 2009) that are adjusted using estimates of net emission transfers 
(defined as CO2 emissions in each country minus the emissions in other countries to 
produce imported goods and services). The emission transfers (or embodied emissions) 
are not physical carbon transfers (e.g., trade of fossil fuels) but are emitted in the 
production of exports (where the fuel is oxidized). The data-set uses inventories that 
include CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion, cement production, and gas flaring but do not 
include emissions from land-use change, such as deforestation (due to lack of data). To  
adjust territorial data for trade, emissions that occur in the supply chain of consumer 
goods and services are allocated to the appropriate nation based on environmentally 
extended input-output analysis (IOA), using annual estimates of GDP (from the United 
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Nations Statistics Division). For example, if Norway extracts and exports crude oil, 
which is imported by the Netherlands to be refined into petroleum, which is imported by 
Germany for transportation fuel, The methodology used by Peters et al. (2011) allocate 
the Norwegian emissions from extraction to the Netherlands, and the refining emissions 
generated in the Netherlands to Germany (see methods section and supporting 
information appendix of Peters et al. 2011 for more detail). 
The uncertainties associated with environmentally-extended IOA include 
aggregation and cutoff errors, missing data, as well as geographical and temporal 
uncertainties (e.g., Lenzen, 2001; Williams, Weber, & Hawkins, 2009). Also, studies 
suggest that uncertainty is higher for consumption-based emissions compared with 
territorial emissions (Lenzen, Wood, & Wiedmann, 2010), however they also indicate 
that the trends and absolute values are consistent across data, methods, and independent 
studies (Peters, Davis, & Andrew, 2012; Wiedmann, Lenzen, Turner, & Barrett, 2007; 
Wiedmann, 2009). To remain consistent with the consumption-based emission data-set 
from Peters et al. (2011), this research distinguishes developed nations as the countries 
included in Annex B and the developing and/or underdeveloped nations are classified as 
the non-Annex B countries under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Measuring Human Development 
Defining and measuring development is a topic of extensive literature and 
depends on the values and frameworks employed within disciplines concerning what 
should be developed (e.g., Parris & Kates, 2003; Woolcock, 1998; Baster, 1972). Three 
distinct categories of what should be developed are found in the literature: people, 
economy, and society (Parris & Kates, 2003). Early literature focuses on developing the  
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Figure 2. Correcting for trade in CO2 emission inventories. Each arrow represents a 
country/region moving horizontally from territorial to consumption-based carbon 
emissions, in the year 2004. The vertical axes are life expectancy (a) and income (b). 
The arrowhead size represents national population. Carbon importers are red; 
exporters, grey; net-neutral countries are blue circles. The fit curves are shown for 
both consumption-based (blue) and territorial (green) emissions, with the shaded 
bands corresponding to one standard error intervals. Note that the arrows do not 
represent residuals from the fit curves. Reprinted by permission from Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd: Nature Climate Change (Steinberger et al. (2012). Pathways of human 
development and carbon emissions embodied in trade. Nature Climate Change). 
Copyright (2012). 
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economy, including employment, consumption and wealth (e.g., Solow, 1956; Lucas, 
1988; Azariadis & Drazen, 1990). More recently, the focus has shifted toward a greater 
emphasis in people in terms of human development, commonly indicated by life 
expectancy, education, equity, and opportunity (UNDP, 2002; IMF, 2000; Sen 1999a, 
1999b; Nussbaum and Sen, 1992). There are also authors who are concerned with 
developing society in the context of national states, regions, institutions and social capital 
(Putnam, 1995; Woolcock, 1998). Depending on the scale of application, the indicators 
may be very broad (consensus among varied stakeholders) or narrow (independent 
efforts).  Although there is much ambiguity in characterizing development, measuring it 
is critical for decision-making and management purposes (Parris & Kates, 2003), at the 
same time it is important to bear in mind the underlying preferences and choices of 
indicators used and their potential implications (Ravallion, 2011). 
To inform the post-Kyoto UNFCCC process, this research calls for a broad 
method of measuring development in a way that embodies the Parties of the convention, 
relies on widely available data, yet offers a single informative value. Moreover, to 
maintain the interdisciplinary approach to climate policy in this study, individual 
indicators such as GDP (development in terms of economic standards) or ecological 
footprint measurements (impacts of human activity on the environment) are too narrow in 
scope. Thus, this research seeks a multidimensional view of development available via a 
composite index. Table 2 outlines some of the available options for measuring 
development given these criteria. 
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Table 1. Composite Indices of Development-related Data 
 
 
 
Index 
Number  
of  
Indicators 
Countries 
covered 
Focus 
Temporal 
Coverage 
Reference 
Human 
Developmen
t Index 
4 
 
186 
Socio-
economic 
measure of 
development 
1980-2012 
UNDP, 
2013 
Well-being 
of Nations 
123 183 
Quality of 
Life and 
Environment 
1990-2000 
Prescott-
Allen, 2001 
National 
Well-Being 
Index 
4 171 
Life 
satisfaction 
Data from 
multiple 
years (1990-
1997) to 
create one 
index 
Vemuri & 
Costanza, 
2006 
Happy 
Planet Index 
3 
 
151 
Sustainable 
well-being 
2006, 2012 
Happy 
Planet 
Index, 2012 
 
Multi-
dimensional 
Poverty 
Index 
 
10 
104 
developin
g 
countries 
Poverty/ 
poorest 
individuals 
2012 
Alkire & 
Santos, 
2010 
Economic 
Freedom of 
the World 
Index 
42 141 
Economic 
freedom 
1997-2012 
Gwartney, 
Lawson & 
Hall, 2012 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators 
6 212  Governance 1996-2008 
Kaufmann, 
Kray, 
Mastruzzzi, 
2009 
Country 
Policy 
Institutional 
Assessments 
14 77 Governance 2005-2009 
World 
Bank, 2013 
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From the examined list of indices in Table 2, this research employs the Human 
Development Index (HDI) for several reasons. First, the temporal and geographical 
coverage of the data is critical for examining recent human development achievements 
and enables the study of development trajectories of many countries over time (the 
temporal coverage aligns with the consumption-based CO2 emission data-set employed). 
Second, the HDI is an index published by the United Nations Development Programme, 
thus it is already aligned with the overall objectives and structure of the United Nations. 
Third, the index includes indicators in the health (average life expectancy), education 
(combined measures of expected and mean years of schooling), and income (gross nation 
income per capita) dimensions of development, providing average measures valued by 
both the economic and social disciplines. Most importantly, the HDI has been found to 
play a significant role in raising the political profile of health and educational policies 
(Atkinson et al. 1997) to be a measure of a nation’s vulnerability to climate-related 
extreme events (Patt et al., 2010) and its dimensions determinants of vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity at the national level (Brooks, Adger, & Kelly, 2005). All HDI data used 
in this research were retrieved from the United Nations Development Programme’s 
database (available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/).  
In Chapter 4, the methodology used to calculate a nation’s HDI level is outlined, 
and a discussion of aggregation and normalization issues is provided. Additionally, a 
sensitivity analysis on the HDI in performed in relation to this research. It is important to 
recognize that the HDI (and other composite indices) use techniques to average data and 
therefore do not offer insights into the inequalities present within nations, but is 
nevertheless informative for the current nation-based policy structure of the UNFCCC. 
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A CO2-HDI Framework  
The HDI is inspired by the capabilities approach to justice (Sen 1999a, 1999b; 
Nussbaum and Sen, 1992; Nussbaum 2000, 2006), which is a theory of basic human 
entitlements that provides a standard for determining whether people possess the various 
capabilities necessary for living a genuinely human life (a list of ten entitlements is 
provided by Nussbaum (1997), which are outlined in Figure 3). The capabilities approach 
provides a framework for thinking about development in terms beyond those used in 
traditional welfare economics, where the focus is not only on the rights individuals have 
but also on what those rights enable people to do. For example, Sen (1990) observes that 
societies typically differ in their capacity to convert income and commodities into 
valuable human achievements. Figure 3 illustrates the types of mechanisms needed to 
transform income, commodities, and rights into actual achievements, such as 
communication, transportation, education, and health care. For example, a U.S. citizen 
has the right to life under the Bill of Rights, but to actually attain a life of normal length a 
person requires access to adequate and affordable health care.  The theory of the 
capabilities approach also inspired the creation of the HDI. 
This research extends the capabilities approach framework (illustrated in Figure 
3) to understand the relationship between CO2 and human development through energy. 
Energy can be thought of as a co-requisite for transforming rights into capabilities 
because it enables modern forms of communication, transportation, education, and health 
care (which are important for human development). This is supported by the empirical 
relationship between energy consumption and HDI for many countries shown by Figure 
4.  
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Figure 4.  Empirical comparison of energy consumption and HDI levels for many 
countries. Primary energy consumption data was retrieved from the Energy Information 
Administration. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual Framework of the Capabilities Approach extended to CO2, energy 
and Development 
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Moreover, under current technology constraints, energy production generates 
emissions of CO2, a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion. Note that renewable-energy 
technologies are at least several decades away from substantially replacing oil, coal, and 
natural gas energy sources (Ayres & Ayres, 2010). Therefore, the HDI (dependent 
variable) offers a relative measure of the health and education achievements, as well as 
an indicator of income, experienced by an average citizen in each country. Thus, 
comparing the HDI level to the consumption-based, per capita CO2 emissions 
(independent variable) allows the examination of a nation’s ability to transform 
consumed goods and services (enabled by the production of energy, which generates CO2 
emissions) into human development achievements. In this work, correlations between 
HDI and CO2 emissions are completed for many countries, and at all ranges of HDI 
levels. The comparisons will help clarify the role CO2 plays in enabling human 
development, and will inform policymakers about how to allocate CO2 emissions without 
inhibiting development progress. 
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Abstract 
Human development, energy, and greenhouse gases are inherently linked under 
current technology constraints. An empirical comparison illustrates that nations with 
higher human development values (in terms of the United Nation’s Human Development 
Index (HDI)) contribute more carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions as a result of greater 
energy consumption. This finding seemingly places environmental sustainability at odds 
with advances in human development. However, the comparison also exposes the 
diminishing returns in HDI that accrue as emissions increase. If accurate, this relationship 
suggests that the developed world can make emission cuts without experiencing major 
set-backs in human well-being. It also suggests that under a global mitigation system, 
emission cuts in developed nations could enable emission increases in underdeveloped 
countries that result in major improvements to the human condition. Therefore, we 
investigate the diminishing returns to HDI in the context of sustainable climate policy 
design. We find that the saturation-like trend is inherent to development indicators and 
not driven by the functional form of the HDI. Also, the global trend is not consistently 
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detected when the development pathways of individual nations are examined. 
Nevertheless, a clear relationship between CO2 and HDI emerges within the least 
developed nations; fourteen of which show consistent advances in HDI as emissions 
increase over time. These findings suggest that sustainable climate policy should not 
allocate emission rights away from these nations. Furthermore, most developed nations 
exhibit periods of HDI improvement while emissions decline, reinforcing the criticality 
of employing broader development measures beyond indicators of income for sustainable 
policy design. 
Introduction 
The Energy-CO2-Development Nexus  
It is undeniable that energy is fundamental for human development. The 
exploitation of inexpensive fossil fuels has historically been the foundation of the 
industrial and agricultural revolutions, which enabled remarkable increases in the 
standard of living for hundreds of millions people.  On the other hand, countries with 
poor access to modern energy resources remain in poverty; over 1.6 billion people 
(almost one third of humanity) have no electricity and consequently lack essential energy 
services for schools, health centers and income generation (Birol, 2007). In fact, no 
country consuming the energy equivalent to 750kg of oil per year per capita achieves an 
average life expectancy of over 75years (World Bank, 2011).  
However, energy also has a down-side under current technology constraints. The 
combustion of fossil fuels for energy production is the primary source of harmful 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contributing to climate change (Barker et al., 2007). 
Also, it will be at least several decades before renewable-energy industries can 
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substantially replace oil, coal, and natural gas energy sources (Ayres & Ayres, 2010). A 
further complication is that the inequities of how energy is consumed globally translate 
into differentiating responsibilities for contributing to global warming. In 2004, 
developed countries (Annex I countries under Kyoto) had 20% of the world’s population, 
but accounted for 46% of global GHG emissions. On the other hand, 80% of the 
population living in developing nations (non-Annex I countries under Kyoto) emitted 
54% (Barker et al., 2007). In terms of regional per capita emissions, the difference is 
even more pronounced; The US and Canada are home to 5.0% of the population and 
emits 19.4% of GHG emissions, while 30.3% of the population in South Asia emits just 
13.1% (Barker et al., 2007).   
The deleterious effects of climate change, resulting from GHG emissions, are also 
likely to be heterogeneous. Some regions will experience significant negative effects such 
the loss of life and property due to sea level rise, climate extremes, loss of agricultural 
productivity, and damage to infrastructure from the melting of permafrost and/or more 
frequent extreme weather events. Others may experience minor negative effects or 
successfully adapt to changing environmental conditions. Lastly, certain countries (such 
as Russia and Canada) may experience net benefits such as lower winter heating costs 
due to warmer temperatures, a longer agricultural growing season, increased forest 
productivity, or an expansion of tourism due to land use changes (UNDP, 2007). These 
inequalities in impact and adaptive capabilities suggest that global climate change is 
likely to create both winners and losers (Tol, 2009). Under any climate scenario, the 
poorest individuals will likely suffer the most. Underdeveloped countries that have 
contributed minimally to the problem are already suffering from rising temperatures (e.g., 
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from sea-level rise and/or agricultural setbacks), and typically lack the ability to adapt in 
terms of things like financial resources, poor infrastructure, and weak institutions 
(O’Brien & Leichenko, 2006).  
Consequently, there is an inequitable distribution of the benefits as well as 
damages associated with energy consumption and anthropogenic climate change. An 
empirical comparison between a nation’s human development level (according to the 
United Nations Human Development Index or HDI) and per capita carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions (we look particularly at consumption-based emissions; reasons for this 
provided in the next section) shows a clear correlation: nations with higher per capita 
CO2 emissions exhibit greater achievements in human development (Figure 5). However, 
the comparison also reveals the diminishing returns to HDI as nations transition to higher 
level of per capita emissions (indicated by the regression of the data in Figure 5). This 
relationship is also referred to as “plateau” by Pasternak (2000) or “saturation” by 
Martinez and Ebenhack (2008). We hypothesize that the diminishing returns we observe 
is an artifact of human well-being indicators (such as proxies for health and education) 
becoming less dependent on energy and carbon as nations develop. If accurate, the 
implication is that emission reductions on the part of the developed countries may not 
mean significant sacrifices to human well-being. Furthermore, Figure 5 suggests that 
under global CO2 limits (e.g., to keep temperature increases below 2º C) emission 
reductions by developed countries could enable major improvements in the quality of life 
for individuals within the world’s least developed nations. Thus climate policy and 
sustainable development, i.e., development that gives priority to the needs of the poor and 
recognizes the limitations of the environment’s ability to support humanity (United 
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Nations, 1987), are inherently interrelated; efforts to address one without considerations 
of the other will likely be unsuccessful (Beg et al., 2002; Swart, Robison, & Cohen, 
2003). This research therefore explores the relationship between per capita CO2 
emissions and the observed diminishing returns to HDI in many countries to clarify its 
implications for sustainable global climate policy. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison between consumption-based per capita emissions (includes 
emissions transfers from international trade) and HDI by country in 2010. The size of the 
bubbles indicates each country’s relative population. Select countries are labeled. 
Singapore is excluded from the figure due to its very high per capita emissions (48 tons 
per capita and HDI of 0.864). The green trend-line is the logarithmic regression of the 
data with an R2 value of 0.845 (the closer the R2 value is to 1, the better the fit). 
Literature Review 
The diminishing returns to HDI when compared with energy and/or CO2 
emissions have been identified previously. For example, Pasternak (2000) examined the 
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relationship between HDI and per capita electricity consumption for 60 countries and 
estimated the electricity consumption needed to bring all countries to the 4,000kWh per 
year level, the threshold for achieving an HDI of 0.9 or greater in 1997. Martinez & 
Ebenhack (2008) showed that the diminishing return to HDI from per capita energy 
consumption for 120 countries was stronger when major energy exporting countries (e.g., 
OPEC nations) were filtered out. Also, Mechtenberg et al. (2012) found that human 
development is exponentially related to electricity consumption and uses the relationship 
to identify nations with low HDI that may benefit from human powered electricity 
generation. However, what these authors fail to elucidate is how the aggregation of the 
data included in the HDI influences the relationship they observe. That is, the 
methodology used to aggregate diverse data-sets (e.g., with different units and distinct 
ranges) may oversimplify or exaggerate important aspects of data, thereby potentially 
misleading decision-makers (Prado, Rogers, & Seager, 2012).  
Moreover, there is a paucity of information on how the relationship between HDI 
and energy or CO2 indicators changes over time. In a few instances, authors have 
compared an early data set (circa 1960’s & 1970’s) to more recently reported data 
(1990’s and early 2000’s), noting improvements in the HDI attainable at different levels 
of energy (Suarez, 1995; Pasternak, 2000). Also, HDI and ecological footprint were 
found to increase together when country-level data for both indicators are contrasted for 
the years 1975 and 2003 (Moran, Wackernagel, Kitzes, Golfinger, & Boutaud, 2008). 
There are, however, only two studies (by the same lead author) that consider changes in 
HDI for more than two points in time (necessary to observe the saturation-like effect). 
One study computed regressions for HDI versus per capita primary energy at the 
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aggregate level (for 80 countries) and territorial based carbon emissions data (for 93 
countries) from 1975 to 2005 (Steinberger& Roberts, 2010).  They found that HDI levels 
were achieved at decreasing levels of energy and carbon emissions over time and show 
the differences in energy/carbon trends with increasing HDI for six select countries over 
the same time period. A more recent study compared both energy and carbon emissions 
to human development indicators (life expectancy and GDP) for many countries in 2004. 
The diversity in development trajectories of thirteen select nations was also shown. One 
of the key findings was that high life expectancy can be achieved at a large range of 
carbon emission levels, whereas income is much more closely linked with carbon. This is 
an important finding, as it suggests that mitigation on the part of the developed nations, 
even if it negatively impacts income, does not necessarily mean significant costs to non-
income components of human well-being (Steinberger, Roberts, Peters, & Baiocchi, 
2012). This latter study, in particular, emphasizes the criticality of considering broader 
measures of development, beyond measures of income, when assessing sustainable 
climate policy.  
Research Objectives 
The key point is that the relationship between CO2 and human development has 
critical implications for global climate policy. If CO2 is a necessary component for 
human development advances, than sustainable climate policy would include 
mechanisms that protect the minimum amount of CO2 needed for sufficient development. 
This research seeks to clarify this relationship further in two specific ways. First, we 
investigate the 2010 HDI methodology to determine how the index calculation influences 
the diminishing returns to HDI as per capita CO2 emissions increase. This will elucidate 
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how valuable the HDI is in terms of informing sustainable climate policy.   Second, we 
examine individual development pathways of countries from 1990-2010 to determine if  
the diminishing returns to HDI we observe at the global level is also exhibited by 
individual countries, as their consumption-based per capita CO2 emissions increase over 
time. Studying the distinct development pathways of nations compared to their CO2 
emissions is important to assess the implications of mitigation efforts on country-level 
human development. 
Methodology 
Taking a systems approach to the sustainability issues of climate change and 
sustainable development require considerations of economic, social and environmental 
aspects of these challenges. Our investigation is therefore designed to include indicators 
for each sustainability pillar. The environmental pillar is reflected in our independent 
variable: consumption-based CO2 emissions per capita. The economic and social 
dimensions are represented via indicators within the HDI, our dependent variable. In this 
section we describe the reasons for using these particular variables for this research. 
Independent variable: Consumption-Based Per capita CO2 Emissions 
Under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) accounting rules, 
mitigation only applies to “greenhouse gas emissions and removals taking place within 
national territory and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction”, also known 
as a country’s territorial emissions (IPCC, 2008). The problem is that inventories of 
territorial emissions do not include life-cycle considerations. That is, it assigns the 
carbon-dioxide of goods produced for export to the producing countries (i.e., the 
exporters), rather than the consuming countries (i.e., the importers).  Consequently, 
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results indicate that CO2 emissions in developed nations have generally stabilized, while 
emissions from developing nations have about doubled since 1990 (Le Quéré et al., 
2009).  
Alternatively, Peters, Mix, Weber, and Edenhofer  (2011) provides us with a 
consumption-based emissions accounting methodology that considers emission transfers 
between nations via international trade from 1990-2010; territorial emission inventories 
are adjusted using estimates of net emission transfers (defined as CO2 emissions in each 
country minus the emissions in other countries to produce imported goods and services). 
The consumption-based emission data used in this research use inventories that include 
CO2 from fossil-fuel combustion, cement production, and gas flaring and do not include 
emissions from land-use change, such as deforestation. To adjust territorial data for trade, 
emissions that occur in the supply chain of consumer goods and services are allocated to 
the appropriate nation based on environmentally extended input-output analysis (see 
methods section of Peters et al. 2011). Studies suggest that uncertainty is higher for 
consumption-based emissions compared with territorial emissions (Lenzen, Wood, & 
Wiedmann, 2010), however they also indicate that the trends and absolute values are 
consistent across data, methods, and independent studies (Peters, Davis, & Andrew, 
2012; Wiedmann, Lenzen, Turner, & Barrett, 2007; Wiedmann, 2009). To remain 
consistent with the consumption-based emission data-set from Peters et al. (2011), this 
paper distinguishes developed nations as the countries included in Annex B and the 
developing and/or underdeveloped nations are classified as the non-Annex B countries to 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
Unlike territorial based emission accounting (that do not take trade into account), 
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consumption-based inventories show that most developed countries have significantly 
increased their GHG emissions since 1990, despite their Kyoto commitments, through the 
consumption of goods and services produced in developing nations (Peters et al., 2011). 
They also result in higher correlations with human development indicators (i.e., life 
expectancy, income, literacy, & HDI) when compared to territorial emission accounting 
(Steinberger et al., 2012). That is, shifting from territorial to consumption-based 
emissions results in countries moving closer to the regression curve (i.e., the green curve 
in Figure 5); in general, developed nations (or net importers) move right and many 
developing countries (net exporters) tend to shift left on the graph (see Figure 1 in 
Steinberger et al., 2012). The results are useful to understand the distribution of final 
goods and services as well as the benefit gained by consumers from the embodied 
emissions of products, both reasons why we employ consumption-based emission data in 
this research.  
One drawback is that trade-corrected inventories do not apportion emissions to 
the indirect socio-economic gains that may accrue in a nation from product manufacture 
and export (e.g., employment, technology advancements). For example, the impact of 
foreign direct investments on the human development of host countries is a popular topic 
in development studies (e.g., Reiter, 2010; Rodrik 2006; Sharma & Gani, 2004). 
Moreover, development theory and case studies suggest that manufacturing (whether it’s 
driven by foreign investors or domestic efforts) has been the cornerstone of development 
(especially economic growth) in many nations (e.g., Gereffi 1989; Hartwick & Peet, 
2009; Anwar, 2008). The implications of this for our results are included the discussion 
section of this paper.  Here, we focus on per capita consumption-based emissions (total 
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emissions attributed to a nation, divided by the population), which approximates the 
distribution of emissions among individuals within a nation.  
Dependent Variable: Human Development Index 
We measure human development in terms of the United Nations Human 
Development Index (HDI), which provides a composite measure of a nation’s income, 
education and health standards. The HDI is inspired by the capabilities approach to 
justice, which is a theory of basic human entitlements that provides a standard for 
determining whether people possess the various capabilities necessary for living a 
genuinely human life (Sen, 1999a, 1999b; Nussbaum and Sen, 1992; Nussbaum, 2000, 
2006). Using the HDI for measuring human welfare establishes a broader understanding 
of human well-being (compared with consumption measures alone), which is important 
for climate mitigation policy because it addresses factors that are basic for human life to 
function and flourish, which will be critical if we are to implement a concept of climate 
justice that allows for the basic functioning of human communities and the environment 
(Schlosberg, 2009). All HDI data used in this research were retrieved from the United 
Nations Development Programme’s database (available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/).The next section outlines the methodology employed to 
determine a nation’s HDI level, and how the process influences the CO2/development 
relationship. 
2010 HDI Calculation 
The HDI is inherently complicated by the task of aggregating data in different units and 
diverse scales of measurement. The HDI dimension of education combines mean years of 
schooling for adults and expected years of schooling for children (weighted equally), 
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with a range of zero to about twenty years. Also, health is measured by life expectancy at 
birth with a range of 20 to about 80 years. Lastly, the income dimension is reported in 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita PPP$ (which includes international economic 
transfers), with a range from $100 to $108,000. In most cases, the goalposts for each 
dimension are observed maxima and minima for all countries (Table 3). Before 
aggregating the data, the HDI uses a rescaling procedure to normalize the indicators to an 
identical range between zero and one. Both life expectancy and years of schooling are 
transformed linearly (equation 1). The income index is normalized differently using a 
logarithmic transformation (equation 2). Finally all three indices are aggregated using a 
geometric mean (equation 3), assigning equal weight to each dimension (Klugman, 
Rodrigues, & Choi, 2011). For a graphical depiction of this normalization procedure, 
refer to Figure 6. 
Table 2. Dimensions, indicators and goalposts used to calculate the 2010 HDI 
Dimension Indicator Observed Maximum Minimum 
Health Life Expectancy 
(years) 
83.2  
(Japan, 2011) 
20 
Education 
Mean Years of 
Schooling 
13.2  
(United States, 2000) 
0 
Expected Years of 
Schooling 
20.6  
(Australia, 2002) 
0 
Standard of 
Living 
Per capita income 
(PPP$) 
108,211 
(United Arab Emirates, 
1980) 
163  
(Zimbabwe, 2008) 
 
                 
                          
                           
                  (1)    
               
  (           )    (        )
  (            )    (        )
                             (2) 
         (                                    )
                            (3) 
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The normalization, weighting, and aggregation inherent to the HDI could distort 
outcomes (Prado & Seager, 2011), especially since normative judgments are used to 
justify procedures (Kovacevic, 2010). For example, the 2010 HDI assigns equal weights 
to all three dimensions, reflecting the notion that health, education and income are 
equally important to human development (it is also statistically justified, see 
Noorbakhsh1998). Furthermore, the logarithmic normalization of the income index is 
based on the assumption that increases in income have a diminishing marginal effect on 
human well-being (Kovacecic & Aguna, 2010; Stanton, 2007; Cahill, 2002; Haq, 1999).  
In other words, the logarithmic transformation reflects the notion that people do not need 
excessive financial resources to ensure a decent standard of living. 
Using a natural logarithm to normalize income is of particular concern for this 
research, since it produces a saturation-like trend between GNI and per capita CO2 that is 
not observed before the normalization procedure (see Figure 6(c) and 6(d)). 
Consequently, countries with GNI levels near the reported minimum see greater returns 
in HDI than those with high GNI levels for the same income increase. For example, the 
highest valuation of income comes from Zimbabwe (lowest HDI value of 0.140 in 2010), 
with a 4.1% increase in HDI for each 1% increase in income, while Liechtenstein has the 
lowest income valuation (highest HDI of .938 in 2010), with a 0.05% increase in HDI for 
a 1% increase in income (Kovacevic, 2010). Another significant component of the HDI 
methodology  is the use of a geometric mean (multiplicative aggregation) to combine the 
dimensions, since it implies diminishing marginal returns in each of the sub-indices and  
Intensifies the diminishing returns of the logarithmic transformation of GNI due to its 
exponential form (equation 3) (Klugman et al., 2011).  
42 
 
 
Therefore, examination of the HDI methodology demonstrates that diminishing 
returns, especially to the income dimension, are inherent to the HDI calculation. Plus, 
from Figure 6(a) and 6(e), it is apparent that even before the normalization and 
aggregation occurs, both life expectancy and measures of education exhibit diminishing 
returns as per capita CO2 emissions increase by country. This means that the diminishing 
Figure 6. Graphical depiction of how the 2010 HDI is calculated. All graphs contain 
consumption-based per capita CO2 emissions on the x-axis.  Both mean and expected 
years of schooling (e) are weighted equally and combined using a geometric mean. 
The orange arrows show the process of normalization, where each data-set is rescaled 
to a range between zero and one. Life expectancy (a) and combined measures of 
education (e) are normalized using equation 1 (results shown in (b) and (f)).  GNI (c) is 
normalized using equation 2 (result shown in (d)). The red arrows show the 
aggregation of each dimension via equation 3 (final result shown in (g)). Data on the 
development indicators was retrieved from United Nations Development Programme, 
2010 consumption-based CO2 emissions data provided through personal 
communication with Dr. Glen Peters. 
43 
 
returns to HDI is inherent to some of the indicators chosen and not just an artifact of its 
functional form. However, the question remains how the methodological judgments of 
the index influence the shape of the resulting saturation-like curve. 
Sensitivity Analysis  
To bolster the robustness of the HDI functional form and to clarify its influence 
on determining the diminishing returns relationship observed between gains in human 
development to increasing CO2 emissions, we conducted our own sensitivity analysis 
using 2010 HDI and consumption-based CO2 emission data. We are interested in 
clarifying how the logarithmic transformation of the income dimension and the geometric 
mean of all dimensions influence the observed saturation-like effect shown in Figure 5. 
We compared the results of the 2010 HDI methodology to other computed versions of the 
HDI, which lack the logarithmic and exponential qualities that may be enhancing the 
diminishing returns to HDI. 
We computed several test versions of the 2010 HDI and their logarithmic 
regressions (of the form:        (   )   ), displayed in Figure 7. HDI 2010 
(blue diamonds) is the result of using the 2010 HDI methodology and serves as a point of 
comparison for the three test versions. Test version HDI 1 (red squares) employs the non-
logarithmic normalization formula (equation 1) for the income dimension, and aggregates 
with a geometric mean (multiplicative aggregation). Version HDI 2 (green triangles) uses 
the natural logarithmic function to normalize the income dimension (equation 2), but 
employs an arithmetic mean (additive aggregation) to combine the data. The final test 
version HDI 3 (black crosses) uses a non-logarithmic formula (equation 1) to 
normalizethe income dimension, and an arithmetic mean to aggregate the three 
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dimensions, this version therefore has no logarithmic or exponential transformations of 
the data. 
 
Figure 7. A comparison between the results of the 2010 HDI methodology and three 
other test versions. To quantify the differences between results, the logarithmic 
regressions (of the form HDI=A*ln(CO2)+B) and maximum achieved HDI are displayed 
for each version.  The R
2
 values of the regressions are also reported in the table, 
representing the goodness of fit for each trendline (the closer the R
2 
value is to 1, the 
better the fit). 
Sensitivity Results 
As a result of the methodological comparisons in Figure 7, we can infer that the use 
of the natural logarithmic transformation in the income dimension (HDI 2010 & HDI 2) 
results in an upward shift of HDI values, relative to when the non-logarithmic 
normalization procedure is used for all dimensions (HDI 1 & HDI 3). Also, the indices 
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with the same aggregation procedures but different normalization methods (e.g., HDI 
2010 & HDI 1) exhibit large differences in HDI values when compared to the indices 
with same normalization procedures and different aggregation methods (e.g., HDI 2010 
& HDI 2). This suggests that the normalization method (logarithmic or not) has a greater 
impact on the results than the choice of aggregation. The change in the rate of return of 
the trend-line is also determined by the version employed, since HDI 3 shows a faster 
decline in HDI advances than the other versions.  Most importantly, all test versions, 
including HDI 3 that contains no logarithmic or exponential transformations of the data, 
show diminishing returns, indicating that the saturation-like effect of HDI is not caused 
by the functional form of the composite index and is an artifact of the indicators included 
in the index. However the rate of diminishing returns, range of HDI values attained, and 
potential saturation levels vary depending on the methodology employed.  
Human Development Pathways at the Country Level 
Country Level Analysis 
Sustainable climate policy must consider more than global trends in GHG 
emissions and human development, especially given the diversity in socio-economic 
aspects, political factors, and climate change impacts across nations (Mendelsohn, 2000; 
Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 1999; Adger, 2001). That is, an equitable 
(and likely effective) mitigation system would consider the variability of the CO2/HDI 
relationship among individual nations. To better understand the applicability of the global 
trend to the country level, we examine the development pathways of individual countries 
from 1990-2010 (determined by data availability) in terms of their consumption-based 
CO2 emissions and attained HDI. Although 93 countries were included in Figure 5, three 
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nations (Belarus, Georgia, and Nigeria) did not have adequate historical HDI and 
consumption-based emissions data to be examined in this part of the study. We 
constructed graphs of the remaining 90 development pathway at five year-intervals and 
visually examined them for saturation-like trajectories. Figure 8a shows the pathways for 
24 of the countries studied, selected to show a variety of development levels and 
pathways. In Figure 8b we zoom in on the 14 developing nations whose HDI levels were 
below 0.5 in 1990 and display trends consistent with the regression ins Figure 5. As 
expected, very diverse development pathways are exhibited at the country level. 
Country Level Results 
Nations generally experience increases in HDI throughout the time period, 
although a small minority did see some declines (e.g., South Africa, Ukraine, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe). For this research it is helpful to classify the 90 pathways examined into 
three categories relative to our original hypothesis, that nations experience diminishing 
returns to human development as their per capita emissions increase, even at the country 
level:   
Support. Thirty-two of the nations (35.5%) have pathways that support the 
hypothesis, by displaying trajectories consistent with a saturation-like trend for the entire 
20 year time period). The majority (29/32) of these nations are developing countries, 
fourteen of which had 1990 HDI levels under 0.5 (Figure 8b). This category includes 
developing nations, like Uganda and Pakistan, which even today show major growth in 
HDI for very small increases in CO2, but also developed nations, like Belgium and 
Singapore, who exhibit very gradual increases in HDI for large increases in per capita 
CO2. 
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Figure 8. Country Level Development Pathways. On the top (a), the development 
pathways of 22 countries (out of 90 examined) are displayed, showing examples of 
trajectories at a range of development levels. The pathways are shaded different colors, 
depending on the shape of their development trajectory; green pathways are consistent 
with the global diminishing returns trend, red pathways undermine the global trend and 
show alternative trajectories, and pathways in yellow are labeled as inconclusive. On the 
bottom(b), we zoom in on fourteen of the world’s least developed nations that support 
our hypothesis, all having 1990 HDI levels below 0.5. HDI levels are increasing 
throughout the 1990-2010 period except when the white arrows indicate otherwise. 
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Undermine. Seven of the nations (8%) undermine the hypothesis, by showing an 
alternative relationship. For these nations the trend is indirect, where they experience 
increasing HDI with decreases in CO2 emissions (e.g., red pathways in Fig. 8a). Five of 
the pathways belong to Annex I nations (Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, 
United Kingdom) and six (add Hungary to the group) have 2010 HDI levels over 0.8. The 
declines in emissions for these particular nations may be due in part to renewable energy 
promotion policies like the feed-in tariff and renewable portfolio standard (Lipp, 2007; 
Martinot, 2007). There are also other drivers of GHG declines in these countries. For 
example, one study concludes that 60% of energy related CO2emission reductions in 
Germany during the 1990’s were due to the restructuring of the East German economy 
after reunification and the liberalization of energy markets significantly reduced 
emissions in the UK from 1990-2000 (Eichhammer et al., 2001). Another attributes 
significant decreases in energy consumption in Hungary to the deterioration of energy 
intensive industries since 1989 (Szlavik & Csete, 2012).  Madagascar, which remains 
under 0.5 in HDI, also shows a declining trend in per capita emissions. Although the total 
emissions have increased in this country overall, the decline we see in per capita 
emissions is likely attributed to recent population growth, 90% of which live below the 
$2-a-day extreme poverty level indicator used by the World Bank (Clark, 2012). 
Inconclusive. Fifty-one of the pathways (56.6%) are inconclusive, exhibiting 
periods of development that are consistent with global trends but contain alternative 
trajectories at other times. These nations show a range of development levels. Out of the 
36 Annex I nations examined, 26 of them are in this category. Also, 33 of these nations 
(64.7%) have 2010 HDI levels above 0.7, and 6 countries remain below 0.6 in HDI 
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including Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe with 2010 HDI’s around 0.4. However, some 
notable patterns emerge from nations in this category that provide hope for a sustainable 
energy transition. 
Among the large group of nations labeled as ‘inconclusive’, we found two distinct 
patterns, particularly among the more developed nations. Ten countries with HDI levels 
above 0.7 tend to follow an increasing trajectory from 1990-2000, but from 2005-2010 
exhibit a sharp decline in CO2 and an increase in HDI (e.g., Australia, U.S., United 
Kingdom)  (Figure 9a). There is also a smaller group of seven nations with HDI levels 
above 0.6 that show declines in CO2 from 1990-1995, display increasing pathways from 
about 1995-2005, and another decline in CO2 over the last 5 years of the time period 
(e.g., Canada, Austria, Switzerland)  (Figure 9b). In this latter group, most declines in 
CO2 are associated with increasing HDI as well, the exceptions being declines in Estonia 
and Albania from 1990-1995. These patterns of declining CO2 emissions are evidence of 
two economic recessions that occurred in the early 1990’s and late 2000’s.  The recession 
of the early 1990s (associated with the beginning of the Gulf War and resulting spike in 
oil prices) affected the US economy greatly as well as other economies closely linked 
with them, such as Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, as well as Europe and Japan 
to a lesser degree (McNees, 1992). The more recent recession (associated with the U.S. 
housing bubble) damaged financial institutions in developed nations around the world 
(Gore, 2010). In most cases, the declines in CO2 coincide with little to no growth in 
income, whereas health and education continue to prosper, resulting in an overall increase 
in HDI for those time periods. This could be good news for climate policy because it is an  
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Figure 9. Examples of HDI increases while CO2 emissions decline over time. Two 
distinct patterns emerge when the inconclusive development pathways are examined. Ten 
developed nations show increasing trajectories from 1990-2005, then a sharp decline in 
CO2 and increases in HDI from 2005-2010 (shown in (a), top). The other group of seven 
countries exhibits the same recent decline in CO2 and increase in HDI, but also display 
decreases in CO2 from 1990-1995, most of which are associated with increases in HDI as 
well (shown in (b), bottom). 
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indication that some developed economies are able to maintain human development 
improvements despite the potential negative economic impacts of mitigation policies. Of 
course, our analysis does not tell us anything about the long term ability of these nations 
to withstand economic declines without sacrifices in health and education. 
Discussion 
According to the consumption-based emission data we employ in this research, a 
typical American emits just under 19 tons of CO2 a year, which is about 12 times that of 
an average Indian and 60 times that of an average individual living in Mozambique. This 
research shows that the HDI level attained at these wide ranges of emissions is driven by 
both the indicators chosen and how the indicators are aggregated. In terms of income, 
education, and health indicators it is clear that industrialized nations are emitting far more 
CO2 than necessary to maintain high levels of human well-being. The HDI sensitivity 
analysis shows that neither the method of normalization or aggregation actually causes 
the diminishing returns to HDI from CO2 emissions, but does influence the rate of return, 
the range of HDI values attained by nations, as well as the saturation level of the data 
regression curves. Bearing this mind, the HDI is particularly valuable for country 
comparisons and ranking (Kovacecic & Aguna, 2010) but should not be the basis for 
specific climate policy design. That is, Figure 5 is helpful to show the relative 
achievements of nations at various levels of CO2 emissions, and thus useful in 
determining which nations are being more efficient with their emissions than others in 
terms of human development, but it should not be the sole basis for assigning emission 
reduction targets to individual nations.  
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The country-level investigation reinforces this claim. A little over a third of the 
nations we examined (mostly developing nations) have pathways from 1990-2010 
consistent with the global 2010 trend (shown in Fig. 5), and a small minority display 
alternative trajectories during that time. This means that over half the nations exhibit 
more complex development pathways (many of them developed nations) than our 
hypothesis suggests, a portion of which can be explained by declines in per capita CO2 
emissions and income during two economic recessions (see Figure 9). That leaves about 
one third of nations whose development pathways differ from the aforementioned 
patterns; reinforcing the fact that a generalizable model of development for all nations is 
non-existent.  
Nevertheless, this analysis does reveal important findings for designing future 
climate policy. Although developed nations generally do not display consistent 
development trends at the country level, most reveal times when their HDI levels 
continue to increase while their per capita CO2 emissions decrease. We see this most 
clearly among developed nations during times of economic recessions (Figure 9). These 
declines in CO2 are typically reflected in little to no growth in the income dimension of 
the HDI, whereas life expectancy and years of schooling typically continue to rise, 
resulting in an overall higher HDI level. However, given the relatively short time period 
examined here, the sustainability of these non-income parameters in unknown. 
Regardless, if policy-makers use income as the sole proxy for human 
development, it is clear that mitigation efforts become equated with a lower quality of 
life, which reduces the likelihood of mitigation support. However, if development is 
viewed in a broader sense, as in the HDI, mitigation doesn’t necessarily mean sacrifices 
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to a person’s overall well-being. The challenge is then to shift the focus of development 
away from material consumption and more towards less GHG intensive goals, such as 
quality of education and healthier lifestyles. Simultaneously, the challenge of further 
decoupling energy from carbon needs to be addressed, in which renewable energy 
technology development will likely play a significant role. 
On the other hand, when we zoom in on the pathways of the least developed 
nations (such as those with 1990 HDI levels under 0.5; some of which are displayed in 
Figure 8b), they overwhelmingly show large gains in HDI from little to no increases in 
consumption-based CO2 emissions. The instances where developing nations do 
experience HDI increases with no increase in CO2 (or even declines in CO2) could be the 
result of rapid population increases during the time period or may be a result of nations 
that primarily manufacture goods and services for export and consumption elsewhere. As 
mentioned previously, domestic manufacturing, even if the products are consumed 
elsewhere (meaning that the emissions would be allocated to another country), can lead to 
local human development improvements in the form of jobs and wages which under the 
right circumstances may also lead to health and education improvements (e.g., Heintz, 
2007; Chudnovsky & Lopez, 2002; Reiter, 2010).  Nevertheless, the fact that fourteen of 
the nations examined display consistent upward trends in HDI as their per capita CO2 
emissions increase indicates that under current technology constraints, CO2 emissions are 
likely a co-requisite for human development improvements within the least developed 
nations of the world. 
Moreover, our findings inform discussions of equitable CO2 distributions in the 
context of sustainable policy design. On the one hand, some propose that carbon 
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emissions should be allocated on an equal per capita basis (e.g., Singer, 2004; Jamieson, 
2005). Alternatively, others appeal to the fact that emissions play very different roles in 
people’s lives and therefore emission rights should be allocated in a way that those 
differences are reflected (Shue, 1993; Lomborg, 2001). For example, Shue (1993) points 
out the differences between what he calls ‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury’ emissions and argues 
that it would be unjust to ask individuals to surrender necessities so that others can retain 
luxuries. Our analysis supports the latter, since, CO2 is found to play a significant role in 
the ability of developing countries to achieve improvements in HDI, yet not always 
necessary to improve HDI levels within developed nations.  
Furthermore, the fact that underdeveloped nations experience significant gains in 
HDI from relatively small increases in per capita emissions suggests that under a system 
of global mitigation, emission rights should be allocated towards (and not away from) 
these nations. Typically, market-based approaches to mitigation seek the opposite by 
allocating emissions in a way that optimizes profitability (i.e., maximizes GDP per unit of 
emission). Consequently, emission rights are allocated to the richest and most developed 
nations. Alternatively, if climate policies were framed to optimize advances in human 
development per unit of emission, the policy structure would protect the emission rights 
of the least developed nations, while enforcing emission reductions on the already 
sufficiently developed nations. Although the details of Kyoto’s predecessor have yet to 
be determined, country leaders are currently discussing a “universal, legally binding 
international agreement” under which all nations would contribute to the mitigation effort 
at some level (UNEP, 2012). Our findings suggest that emission reductions or limits 
placed on developing nations (especially in the 14 nations identified in Figure 8b) would 
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likely inhibit necessary human development improvements (such as access to modern 
energy sources) within those nations. This result would be in direct opposition of the 
United Nation’s definition of sustainable development (1987), since it would take priority 
away from fulfilling the essential needs the world’s poor.  
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Abstract 
Efforts to stabilize the climate system will undoubtedly place limits on emissions 
of carbon dioxide (CO2), a major green-house gas contributing to global warming but 
also the byproduct of fossil-fuel derived energy. These energy related restrictions threaten 
development progress because energy consumption and its resulting emissions are highly 
correlated with human development. If post-Kyoto policy discussions transition towards 
a universal mitigation system as policy discussions indicate, CO2 limitations on the 
developing world may be detrimental to achieving society’s development goals if not 
approached with caution. Therefore, this research evaluates the impact of emission 
reductions on underdeveloped nations to inform future climate policy. In particular, the 
relationship between internationally traded CO2 (embodied in goods and services) and 
human development advancements (in terms of changes in the Human Development 
Index or HDI as well as the non-income HDI) in underdeveloped nations is examined 
from 1990 to 2010. In addition, HDI changes are correlated with different types of 
governing institutions of nations using the 2010 Polity IV dataset.  We find that nations 
who are net exporters of CO2, or have increased their exports of CO2 over time, 
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experience the greatest gains in HDI and non-income HDI. Moreover, the 
underdeveloped nations with autocratic governance structures see the greatest 
improvements in HDI. We conclude that the establishment of domestic capabilities for 
manufacture and export at some level is important for sustainable development, which 
will undoubtedly generate increased CO2. Thus, we recommend that CO2 allocation, 
which under Kyoto was based on 1990 emission levels, be adjusted to consider the future 
development needs of underdeveloped nations. 
Introduction 
The economic, social, and environmental impacts of climate change are, and will 
continue to be, heterogeneous. The symptoms range from more frequent and intense 
storms in the United States like Superstorm Sandy, to the evacuation of islands in the 
South Pacific due to sea-level-rise, to water shortages, drought, and reduced crop yields 
in India, Brazil, and Argentina. A country’s vulnerability to climate change depends on 
its geography, governance, financial resources as well as technological capabilities 
(World Bank, 2010a). Thus, the most vulnerable are individuals within the world’s least 
developed nations, many of which depend on climate sensitive economic sectors like 
agriculture and lack the technological and financial resources to adapt (Beg et al., 2002). 
Yet, these individuals have made a minimal contribution to the climate change problem. 
In fact, a recent study found a significant negative correlation between per capita CO2 
emissions and vulnerability to climate among 120 nations (Samson, Berteaux, McGill, & 
Humphries, 2011). In other words, the people within underdeveloped countries are least 
responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet are the most susceptible to the 
impacts of a warmer world. 
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The problem of climate change therefore only exacerbates the challenges of 
international development. Renewable-energy technologies are at least several decades 
away from substantially replacing oil, coal, and natural gas energy sources (Ayres & 
Ayres, 2010). Consequently, efforts to stabilize the climate system will undoubtedly 
place limits on emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), a major GHG contributing to global 
warming but also the byproduct of fossil fuel derived energy. These energy-related 
restrictions threaten development progress because energy consumption and its resulting 
emissions are highly correlated with achieved human development (Alam, Bala, Huq, & 
Matin 1991; Alam, Roychowdhury, Islam, & Huq, 1998; Suarez, 1995; Pasternak, 2000; 
Goldenberg, Rovere, Coelho, 2004; Dias, Mattos, Balestieri, 2006; Martinez & 
Ebenhack, 2008; Moran, Wackernagel, Kitzes, Goldfinger & Boutaud, 2008; Sanchez, 
2010; Steinberger & Roberts, 2010; Mechtenberg et al., 2012; Steinberger, Roberts, 
Peters, Baiocchi, 2012; Spierre, Seager, Selinger, in press), which encompasses more 
than economic growth and relates to expanding the choices people have (Sen, 1999a, 
1999b).   
The reality is that about 1.6 billion people (almost a third of humanity) have no 
electricity, and up to a billion more only have access to unreliable electricity networks, 
and consequently lack essential energy services for schools, health centers and income 
generation (Birol, 2007; United Nations, 2010). For example, in 2011 only 41.5% of 
Zimbabwe’s population had access to electricity (World Development Indicators, 2013), 
a factor (one of many) contributing to the relatively short life expectancy, small per 
capita income, and low mean years of schooling (51.4 years, $376 GNI per capita PPP, 
and 7.2 years, respectively in 2012) experienced by the average Zimbabwean (UNDP, 
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2013 ). Thus, the challenge for future climate policy is to effectively mitigate global 
GHG emissions without inhibiting human development progress for underdeveloped 
nations like Zimbabwe. 
Currently, the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) does recognize development as a priority for CO2 allocation, under its 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This is codified in the Kyoto 
Protocol, which exempts developing nations (non-Annex I countries) from binding 
emission reduction targets required of developed nations (Annex I nations). Additionally, 
they can be the recipients of financed sustainable development projects in exchange for 
certified emission reduction credits that the developed nations use to comply with 
emission targets (known as the Clean Development Mechanism or CDM). Despite Kyoto, 
fossil fuel CO2 emissions have grown 41% since 1990. Also, emissions generated in 
developed countries have generally stabilized, while emissions produced in the exempt 
developing countries have doubled (Le Quéré et al., 2009). Moreover, the major finding 
of a review article in Climate Change finds that the market-based CDM does not 
significantly contribute to sustainable development in developing countries, since 
sustainable benefits are not monetized and therefore do not drive investments (Olsen, 
2007).  
Given that the climate policy goals of the UNFCCC are contingent on the 
development trajectories of underdeveloped nations, improved methods of integrating 
mitigation policy with development objectives for future climate policy are needed 
(Schipper & Pelling, 2006).  This is especially warranted now, as the details of Kyoto’s 
predecessor are being determined. Discussions of post-Kyoto climate policy among 
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world leaders (i.e., in Durban and Doha) indicate a transition towards mitigation 
commitments from all parties in the UNFCCC after 2015 (implemented in 2020). Due to 
the coupled nature of energy, CO2 and development under current technology constraints, 
these CO2 limitations on the developing world may be detrimental to achieving society’s 
development goals (e.g., the Millennium Development Goals) if not approached with 
caution. Therefore, this research evaluates the impact of emission reductions on 
underdeveloped nations to inform future climate policy. 
CO2, Trade, and Development 
Recent studies emphasize the criticality of CO2 life-cycle considerations in 
climate policy design, due to the increasing trend of international trade flows of CO2 in 
the globally economy (Carbon Trust, 2006, 2011; Peters & Hertwich, 2008; Weber & 
Matthews, 2007; Davis & Caldeira, 2010; Wiebe, Bruckner, Giljum, & Lutz, 2010;  
Davis, Peters, & Caldeira, 2011; Nakano et al., 2009; Peters et al. 2009; Peters, Minx, 
Weber & Edenhofer, 2011; Peters, Davis & Andrew, 2012).  The basic idea is that in 
today’s globalized economy, goods and services consumed in one country are often 
produced in another country. Known as consumption-based emission inventories, 
emissions generated during the production of goods and services are attributed to the 
consuming nation. Unlike territorial-based emission accounting (like those used by the 
UNFCCC to assess emission target compliance under Kyoto), consumption-based 
inventories show that most developed countries have increased their GHG emissions 
since 1990, despite their Kyoto commitments through the consumption of goods and 
services produced in developing nations (Peters et al., 2011). In fact, the net emission 
transfers from developing to developed countries increased from 0.4 GtCO2 in 1990 to 
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1.6 Gt CO2 in 2008, which exceeds the Kyoto Protocol reduction target of about 5% (or ~ 
-0.7 GtCO2 relative to 1990 emissions (Peters et al. 2011). Consumption-based 
inventories also improve the correlation between per capita carbon emissions and human 
development indicators (Steinberger, Roberts, Peters & Baiocchi, 2012). Understanding 
the flow of international CO2 trade is critical from a climate policy perspective, since it 
helps to elucidate the drivers of emissions, tells us who is ultimately benefiting from 
carbon intensive products, and indicates who is likely to suffer from CO2 limiting 
policies.  
Trade is also important for development, as extensive literature provides 
theoretical and empirical support for the notion that international trade (in general) is an 
ingredient for successful development (e.g., Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, & Trebbi 2002; Mikic, 2011; Beck, 2002; Krueger, 1997). For example, 
trade allows access to needed resources at cheaper prices and in greater variety and 
qualities than would otherwise be available, and can enable specialization and reduction 
in the unit costs of production.  Thus, trade influences income directly but can also 
facilitate cross-cultural knowledge and technology diffusion, which may promote both 
education and improved health services (Mikic, 2011; Davies & Quinlivan, 2006).  
Alternatively, studies indicate that open trade policies do not automatically 
guarantee human development advancement. For example, governance structures may 
inhibit the link between trade and development (Haggard, 2004; Rodrick et al. 2002) and 
open trade policies may harm infant domestic industries in underdeveloped nations 
(Greenwald & Stiglitz, 2006). Also, the recent economic crisis has revealed that 
globalization has left many countries vulnerable to external shocks, especially in nations 
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that depend on too few product exports and markets (Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 2009). The consensus is that in order for trade to 
transform into achieved human development improvements trade policies must be 
accompanied with appropriate institutional, regulatory and other reforms which are often 
implemented at the national level (Rodrik, 2001). Consequently, trade can be a 
mechanism for development if a society has sufficient capacity in other domestic areas. 
Particular to the trade of embodied CO2, Steinberger and Roberts (2010) indicate 
that CO2 trade balances might also have implications for development. They find that 
many countries with low GDP and relatively short life expectancies are carbon importing 
nations that depend on carbon intensive goods and services produced elsewhere. At the 
same time they suggest that carbon-exporting economies (e.g., countries from former 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Middle East and South Africa) are at a disadvantage in 
accruing socio-economic benefits, relative to net importers, since many of them remain 
below the global trend even when their emissions are corrected for trade (ibid). This 
finding contradicts the notion that trade can be a mechanism for development 
advancement. 
Despite their relative disadvantage when compared with all carbon importers 
(many of which are highly developed nations), we hypothesize that developing and 
carbon-exporting countries may actually be at an advantage in terms of improving human 
development relative to other underdeveloped nations, especially if the appropriate 
governance structures are in place to transform export revenue into human development 
advancements. If substantiated, the implication is that the CO2 required of developing 
nations to produce goods and services domestically may be warranted, even under a 
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global mitigation system, if it is a viable option to escape the poverty trap and establish a 
process of self-sustaining development (Sachs et al., 2004; Bowles, Durlauf, & Koff, 
2006). We investigate our hypothesis by comparing changes in human development over 
time to CO2 emission trade data, authority characteristics of governing institutions, and 
income inequality within nations, for many underdeveloped countries. Because the goal 
is to inform global climate policy, the scale of this research prohibits the examination of 
specific trade and development linkages in every nation or region, although exemplarity 
nations are discussed. Instead, we employ statistical analysis to convey patterns of trade, 
governance, and development across many countries. 
Methodology 
Measuring Development 
Defining and measuring development is a topic of extensive literature and 
depends on the values and frameworks employed within disciplines (e.g., Parris & Kates, 
2003; Woolcock, 1998; Baster, 1972). Here, we are primarily concerned with the 
implications of CO2 mitigation policies on human development related to energy services 
in underdeveloped nations. The notion that access to energy enables human capabilities 
related to desirable end-states like adequate health care, education, mobility, and 
communication stems from the Capabilities Approach developed by Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum & Sen, 1992; Sen, 1999a, 1999b). Consequently, we 
employ a composite index, inspired by the Capabilities Approach and used by the United 
Nations Development Programme, for country level development known as the Human 
Development Index (HDI).  
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The HDI aggregates indicators of health (life expectancy at birth), education 
(combined measures of expected and mean years of schooling) and economic 
development (gross nation income per capita) for many countries. It therefore offers a 
broader measure of development than single component indicators, which is valuable 
when comparing the development of very diverse nations. However, it is important to 
recognize that composite indices like the HDI use techniques to average data and 
therefore do not offer insights into the inequalities present within nations, but is 
nevertheless informative for the current nation-based policy structure of the UNFCCC. 
For this research we are interested in a country’s change in HDI associated with CO2 
emission transfers over time. Note that published HDI figures for different years are not 
comparable, since methodological adjustments occur between publications. However, the 
UNDP recalculates historical HDI figures using the current year’s methodology. Here, 
we employ HDI figures from 1990 to 2010 using the 2010 HDI calculation methodology 
(for details see Klugman, Rodriguez, & Choi, 2011).  
We also compare changes in non-income HDI values (equally weighted education 
and health indicators) with CO2 emission transfers over time to account for cases where 
income may be driving increases in HDI yet may not be enabling improvements in health 
and education (e.g., countries that primarily export fossil fuels, such as Iran). It is these 
non-income components that allow us to examine the relationship between CO2 trade and 
improvements in the human condition. Our dependent variables are calculated using 
equation (1) and (2). 
                          (1) 
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                                                          (2) 
Drawing Boundaries 
We start our analysis by examining a 2010 snapshot of the CO2-HDI relationship 
for the 77 countries that had adequate HDI and CO2 data for this research. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between 2010 HDI levels and consumption-based CO2 emissions per 
capita (from Peters et al., 2011) and identifies which nations are net importers and 
exporters of embodied CO2 emissions in goods and services (calculated by subtracting 
the net CO2 emission transfers from territorial emissions of a nation). A pattern emerges 
from this relationship. In general, achieved HDI and per capita CO2 tend to increase 
together, but at a diminishing rate. In the aggregate, the nations with the lowest HDI tend 
to be net importers, whereas the net exporters are predominately countries with medium 
levels of HDI (although many are net importers). Also it is apparent that most of the 
developed nations (above 0.8 HDI) are mostly net importers of CO2.  (The lone exception 
is Australia). 
This figure helps us to narrow our investigation, since it illustrates a transition 
zone (around 0.8 HDI) between the predominately importing and highly developed 
nations (that have a wide range of per capita emissions) and the mixed group of exporting 
and importing countries with medium and low HDI values (that report a narrower range 
of per capita emissions). In our analysis we focus on the 42 nations in the latter category 
(enclosed in the dashed-red rectangle in Figure 10a), since these are the nations that are 
most likely to be constrained in terms of HDI improvements if CO2 limitations are 
imposed. These nations all report less than 10 tons of per capita CO2 emissions and were 
under the 0.8 HDI level in 2010. 
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We further categorize the 42 underdeveloped nations for analysis by dividing 
them into two groups based on their HDI level in 1990 (Figure 10b). This enables us to 
correlate changes in HDI among net importers and exporters who began the 1990 to 2010 
time period with comparable development levels. The low developed countries (LDCs) 
are defined here as nations with HDI levels less than 0.5 in 1990. There are eighteen 
LDCs with 1990 HDI levels ranging from 0.2 to 0.497. The medium developed countries 
(MDCs) are characterized by HDI levels above 0.5 in 1990. There are 24 MDCs with 
HDI levels from 0.625 to 0.780. 
Emission Transfers 
As emphasized earlier, taking emission transfers into account when attributing 
CO2 to a country, significantly changes the distributive view of emissions. Territorial-
based inventories currently used by the UNFCCC only capture the production stage of 
the CO2 supply chain (where emissions are generated), which can be misleading, 
especially if you’re interested in understanding the drivers and/or benefits of CO2 
emissions to inform climate policy.  
Fortunately, Peters et al. (2012) provides country level CO2 net emission transfer 
data (defined as CO2 emissions generated in each country minus the emissions in other 
countries to produce imported goods and services) from 1990 to 2010. The emission data 
include CO2 from fossil-fuel and cement production but do not include emissions from 
land-use change, such as deforestation. This data also does not include physical transfers 
of carbon, such as traded fossil fuels (Davis et al., 2011). Note that the net emission 
transfers do include emissions generated by fossil-fuel extraction, but the emissions 
produced by burning traded fossil fuels is already encompassed by territorial emission 
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Figure 10. Both (a) and (b) compare per capita consumption-based CO2 emissions (Peters 
et al., 2012) and HDI level for many countries. Red bubbles are net exporters; blue 
bubbles are net importers. In (a), 2010 data for countries at all development levels are 
shown, where the sizes of the bubbles indicate the relative population of each country. 
The nations enclosed in the red rectangle are the focus of this research, all of which have 
2010 HDI levels below 0.8. In (b), 1990 data are shown for only the countries used in this 
analysis, which are divided into two categories: Medium Developed Countries (MDCs) 
and Low Developed Countries (LDCs).  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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inventories. To help clarify the methodology, consider the case where Norway extracts 
oil, exports it to the Netherlands where it is refined, and then exported to Germany to be 
used as transportation fuel. Peters et al. would allocate the emissions generated from 
extraction to the Netherlands, and the emissions generated from refinement to Germany. 
Nonetheless, understanding these net emission transfers is essential to quantify the 
embodied CO2 for traded goods and services and allows us to: identify which MDCs and 
LDCs are net importers and exporters of embodied CO2, compare their economic 
intensities of CO2 trade, and examine how net emission transfers have changed over time.  
First, we calculate the average net emission transfer (NET) for each country over 
the 1990 to 2010 time period and normalize to the nation’s average Gross National 
Income (GNI) for the same time period to account for the size of a nation’s economy 
(World Bank, 2013a). The result is a CO2 intensity of average NETs of CO2 embodied in 
traded goods, according to equation (2). Here, a negative (positive) CO2 intensity 
indicates a nation is a net exporter (importer) of embodied CO2. 
              
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅             
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅             
     (2) 
Second, to capture changes in economies over time (i.e., growth in intensities of 
CO2 imports or exports) we calculate the slope of a least squares linear regression of the 
net emission transfers for the LDCs and MDCs from 1990 to 2010. We will compare both 
these independent variables to changes in HDI over the same time period (calculated 
using equation 1). 
Governance Structure 
To characterize the governance structures of nations, data from the Polity IV 
Project is employed. The quality of governance (in terms of democratic and autocratic 
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authority in governing institutions) of a nation is captured in its Polity score, a 21 point 
scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10(consolidated democracy). A 
nation’s Polity score considers six components of a nation’s central government structure 
that measure executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political 
competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing 
authority. There is a three-part characterization of governance types: ‘autocracies’ (-10 to 
-6), ‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5), and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10). Marshall and Cole (2011) 
define these types of governance structures as the following: 
Democracies (+6 to +10). Characterized by institutions with ‘open, competitive, 
and deliberative political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, 
competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the discretionary 
powers of the chief executive’. Elected governments that score less than a perfect +10 
have ‘weaker checks on executive power, some restrictions on political participation, or 
shortcomings in the application of the rule of law to, or by, opposition groups’. 
Autocracies (-10 to -6). Characterized by institutions where ‘citizens 
participation is sharply restricted or suppressed; chief executives are selected according 
to clearly defined (usually hereditary) rules of succession from within the established 
political elite; and, once in office, chief executives exercise power with no meaningful 
checks from legislative, judicial, or civil society institutions’. Autocracies scoring higher 
than -10 ‘allow some space for political participation or impose some effective limits on 
executive authority’. 
Anocracies (-5 to +5). Characterized as ‘institutions and political elites that are 
far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. 
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Anocratic regimes very often reflect inherent qualities of instability or ineffectiveness 
and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as 
outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime 
changes’. 
The Polity IV dataset covers all nations with populations over 500,000 from 
1800-2011. Here we compare a country’s change in HDI from 1990 to 2010 to their 2010 
Polity score (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2010). Note that the Polity data is open to 
critiques, like any other composite index, due to aggregation and redundancy issues. In 
particular, the Polity Index is criticized for its omission of an indicator of citizen 
participation but it is overall credited for it comprehensive empirical scope of democracy 
(Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). 
Results 
Average Intensities of CO2 and Changes in HDI  
Figure 11 displays the results of the comparison between average CO2 intensities 
of NETs for both the LDCs (Figure 11a, top) and MDCs (Figure 11b, bottom). The 
figures confirm that there are few net exporters of CO2 compared to the number of net 
importers, supporting the notion that CO2 exports are predominately embodied in goods 
and services produced in China, India, and a few other emerging markets and consumed 
in the developed world (Davis et al., 2011). The two largest increases in HDI are 
exhibited by China (LDC in 1990) and Iran (MDC in 1990), respectively, which are both 
net exporters, although China has more than double the CO2 intensity of Iran (169 
compared with 69 ktCO2 per billion dollars PPP). Tunisia comes in third, but is a net 
importer with relatively low CO2 intensity. Overall, the mean change in HDI is slightly 
76 
 
greater for both LDC and MDC exporters than importers (+0.11 and +0.10, respectively), 
which weakly supports our hypothesis. 
Focusing on the LDCs for a moment, among the importers there is a large range 
of CO2 intensities (from Pakistan’s 27 to Mozambique’s 334 ktCO2/ billion dollars PPP) 
and changes in HDI (from Zimbabwe’s -0.06 to Vietnam’s +0.16).  For the exporters 
(China, Egypt, India, and Indonesia), the range in CO2 intensities is smaller (from 
Egypt’s -26 to China’s -169 ktCO2/billion dollars PPP). The change in HDI is also 
relatively high among all the LDC net exporters (from India’s and Indonesia’s +0.13 to 
China’s +0.19). These four net exporters are also the nations that had HDI levels just 
below 0.5 in 1990.  The LDC that stands out the most is China, a net exporter reporting 
an increase in HDI well over one standard deviation above the mean change. However, 
we also have Zimbabwe and Zambia, net importers with HDI changes much less than one 
standard deviation below the mean. Zimbabwe is the only LDC with a decrease in HDI 
from 1990 to 2010. The mean change in HDI for the LDCs is greater for exporters 
(+0.15) than importers (+0.10), which supports our hypothesis. 
When we look just at the MDCs, the results are less clear. The net importers 
exhibit a smaller range in CO2 intensities (from Chile’s 4 to Latvia’s 219 ktCO2/billion 
dollars PPP) and changes in HDI (from Botswana’s +0.037 to Tunisia’s +0.156) when 
compared to the net exporters range of CO2 intensities (from Bolivia’s -19 to South 
Africa’s -351 ktCO2/billion dollars PPP) and HDI changes (from no change in South 
Africa to Iran’s +0.173). The most notable nations are Iran, a net exporter with gains in 
HDI over one standard deviation of the mean change, but also Tunisia, a net importer that 
also achieves relatively large HDI improvements over the mean. However, we also have 
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the net exporter of South Africa, which reports no overall change in HDI and a very high 
CO2 intensity. The mean change in HDI for the MDCs is the same for importers and 
exporters (+0.10), which does not support our hypothesis. 
Average Intensities of CO2 and Changes in non-income HDI  
By taking income out of the HDI calculation, we see a slightly different pattern of 
nations achieve the greatest changes in human development (Figure 12). China drops 
significantly down with only average gains in social indicators, with Egypt taking over 
the lead the LDCs. Zimbabwe and Zambia remain well-below other LDCs in terms of 
social development. For the MDCs, Iran actually increases its achievements in terms of 
social indicators and is the leading nation in terms of human development advancement 
measured by life expectancy and years of schooling.  Tunisia and Turkey (net importers) 
also report relatively high improvements, the same as when income is included. 
Unfortunately, South Africa exhibits negative changes in non-income HDI. The other 
notorious fossil fuel exporting nation included in this analysis is Venezuela, who displays 
greater improvement in social indicators than when income is included.  
Change in Net Emission Transfers and Changes in HDI 
Figure 13 displays the results of the comparison between the change in NETs 
(calculated by taking the slope of the regression line when the yearly net emission 
transfers were plotted from 1990 to 2010) and change in HDI from 1990 to 2010 for the 
LDCs (Figure 13a, top) and the MDCs (Figure 13b, bottom). Thus, the nations in red are 
those that have experienced increases in net exports of embodied CO2 and blue nations 
show increases in net imports of embodied CO2 over the time period. Nations near the 
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vertical axis have not experienced significant changes in their net trade of CO2 over the 
examined time period. 
Among the LDCs, the nations who were average net exporters also show growth 
in their exports of embodied CO2 over time, although Morroco is new on the left side 
(which is on average a net importer but over time has increased its net exports). Also, 
China and India exhibit extreme growth. China increased its net exports of embodied CO2 
by 1.12 trillion metric tons of CO2 (a 685% increase from 1990) and India by 183 million 
metric tons of CO2 (a 2,139% increase from 1990). On the other hand, Vietnam and 
Bangladesh achieve relatively high increases in HDI at the same time as they increase 
their net imports of embodied CO2. Zimbabwe, which experienced a net decrease in HDI, 
exhibits no change in its net emission transfer. Also, Zambia shows a small increase in 
HDI while increasing its CO2 imports. 
The MDCs show a more even distribution, since 14 nations saw increases in their 
net imports and 10 increased their net exports of CO2. For the most part, nations remain 
on the same side of the axis as in Figure 12b, but three average net importers (Turkey, 
Tunisia, Brazil) show increases in their net exports in Figure 13b. There are also two 
average net exporters (Venezuela and Bulgaria) who have experienced increases in their 
net imports of embodied CO2. This is interesting, since the nations that move left (by 
increasing in net exports) are the average net importers with the greatest improvements in 
HDI. This is not the case for the nations moving right (by increasing net imports). 
Venezuela and Bulgaria exhibit HDI changes just above and below the mean change.  
The standouts are once again Iran and Tunisia, both achieving relatively high increases in 
HDI and both exhibiting overall increases in exported CO2. On the other hand, South 
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Africa has also significantly increased its CO2 exports yet experienced no change in HDI. 
Thailand also stands out as a nation that has large growth in exported CO2, but its gains in 
HDI only slightly above the mean and about the same as Mexico who experienced 
relatively large growth in imported emissions. 
Polity Score and Changes in HDI 
Figure 14 shows the comparison between the 2010 Polity score and changes in 
HDI from 1990 to 2010. Overall, there is an indirect relationship between HDI 
advancements and democratic qualities of governing institutions. Among the medium and 
low developed countries we examined, the nations that achieved the greatest gains in HDI 
(China, Iran, Vietnam) are characterized as types of autocracies, where citizen 
participation is not a priority, but a strong central authority governs the nation. Tunisia, 
which experienced relatively high gains in HDI is classified as an anocracy (although it is 
much closer to an autocracy then a democracy). Zimbabwe, with its decrease in HDI 
from 1990 to 2010 is also in the anocracy category. Most nations (29/42) are identified as 
different types of democracies, many of which do experience HDI increases above the 
mean change, but not as high as some of the autocracies. South Africa, with no change in 
HDI, is one of these democratic nations (with a Polity score of 9).  
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Figure 11. Comparison between average net emission transfers (normalized to total GNI) 
and change in HDI for a) LDCs (top), and b) MDCs (bottom). Blue bubbles are average 
net importers and red bubbles are average net exporters from 1990 to 2010. The mean 
and stand deviations are in each figure. 
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Figure 12. Comparison between average net emission transfers (normalized to total GNI) 
and change in non-income HDI for a) LDCs (top), and b) MDCs (bottom). Blue squares 
are average net importers and red squares are average net exporters from 1990 to 2010. 
The mean and stand deviations are indicated in each figure 
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Figure 13. Comparison between the change in net emission transfers (slope of regression 
as transfers are plotted over the 1990 to 2010 period) and change in HDI for (a) LDCs 
(top), and (b) MDCs (bottom). Blue diamonds are countries that have increased their 
exports of embodied CO2. Red diamonds are nations that have increased their imports of 
embodied CO2. The mean and stand deviations of HDI changes are indicated in each 
figure. 
 
83 
 
 
Discussion 
While we recognize that every country has distinct social, economic, and 
environmental drivers of trade, our analysis does not elucidate these factors. For example, 
India and China are both major exporters that achieved relatively large gains in HDI, yet 
are very different in government style and culture. They are also arguably very different 
from many other nations in our analysis. With this in mind, our results and discussion are 
limited in terms of clarifying the specific causes behind HDI changes. Our goal is 
Figure 14. Comparison of 2010 Polity Score and Changes in HDI for both MDCs and 
LDCs. Nations with a Polity score between -10 and -6 are classified as autocracies, 
countries with Polity scores between -5 to +5 are anocracies, and nations scoring 
between +6 and +10 are democracies. Countries that have increased their CO2 exports 
from 1990-2010 are shaded red and those that have increased their CO2 imports are blue. 
The MDCs are denoted by triangles, whereas the LDCs are indicated with squares. 
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therefore to discuss some common trade attributes between nations with similar human 
development achievements.  
Our analysis shows that some CO2 exporting nations do experience great 
increases in HDI from 1990 to 2010 (i.e., China and Iran), and on average, net exporters 
perform slightly better than importers for the countries we examined. However, some net 
carbon importers also experience relatively high increases in HDI, such as Turkey and 
Tunisia for example (although not as high as some exporters). This indicates that nations 
can achieve relatively high improvements in HDI at a range of CO2 trade balances and 
intensities, but a few nations that predominately export embodied CO2 experience the 
highest gains in HDI.  Interestingly, when we look at the non-income components of the 
HDI China performs significantly worse, yet Iran actually increases its gains in human 
development. The case for greater HDI advances through exporting CO2 is strengthened 
by our regression analysis; top performers among the average net importers (e.g., Tunisia, 
Turkey, Brazil, Morocco) show overall growth in their CO2 exports. Surprisingly, the 
Polity scores of nations indicate that the greatest gains in HDI were experienced by 
nations with non-democratic institutions.  
The intensity of traded CO2 for a nation does not seem to correlate with HDI 
success, since the most CO2 intense economies (China, South Africa, Mozambique, and 
Zambia) exhibit a wide range of HDI advances. It is true that China exhibits a relatively 
high CO2 intensity (the highest among the low developed nations) and achieves the 
highest gains in HDI, however other countries with relatively high HDI improvements 
(e.g., Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey) have modest CO2 intensities of their emission transfers.  
The differences in CO2 intensities stem from differences in the energy mixes of these 
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nations. China and South Africa have relatively high CO2 intensities due to their heavy 
reliance on coal for energy production, whereas Iran and Tunisia rely predominately on 
natural gas and oil sources, which have less carbon content (EIA, 2013).  
Among the countries examined, China is the leader in HDI improvement from 
1990 to 2010. Based on the non-income development data, China’s success in terms of 
socio-economic indicators is driven mainly by GNI increases. China is an exporting 
country with relatively high CO2 intensity for emission transfers and has experienced 
extreme growth in the embodied CO2 it exports.  In 2005, about a third of Chinese 
emissions were due to production of exports, which is a substantial increase from 12% in 
1987 and 21% in 2002 (Weber et al., 2008). According to the literature, China’s 
development gains are attributed to low labor and material costs, outward oriented trade, 
and government policies that require joint ventures between foreign and domestic firms, 
which encourage technological transfers that enhance domestic capabilities (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2003; Rodrik, 2006; Park, 2009). Other studies indicate that the level of 
sophistication (Schott, 2006; Wang & Wei, 2010) and diversification (Lemoine & Unal-
Kesenci, 2004; Feenstra & Kee, 2007) of China’s manufactured exports has also 
contributed to recent growth. However, China’s success and competition may be hurting 
other developing countries growth prospects (Gu, Humphrey, & Messner, 2007; Yang, 
2003), and its dependency on coal-powered energy is not sustainable (Weber et al., 2008) 
Iran comes in second for its gains in HDI, and first in non-income HDI over the 
time period. Iran is also an exporter, but its CO2 emission transfers are less intense than 
China, and its growth in CO2 exports, while strong, pale in comparison. Economic 
development in Iran is closely connected to oil revenues, which has contributed to steady 
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growth in recent years, but sheds doubt on the sustainability of its growth path 
(Karshenas, 1990; Esfahani & Pesaran, 2008). However, Iran’s growth in non-income 
development sectors suggests that oil revenues may be aiding the nation in providing 
better health care and educational opportunities to its citizens. It is important to note, 
however, that Iran comes in 76 in terms of the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index, which 
can negatively impact development progress (Klasen &  Lamanna, 2009; Busse & 
Spielmann, 2006). In addition to the investments that Iran’s oil revenues enabled, studies 
credit post-war recovery (in the early 1990’s), institutional reform, deregulation and trade 
liberalization for Iran’s development gains (Salarpour 2007; Esfahani & Pesaran, 2008). 
Also, in recent decades, Iran’s non-oil exports have become more diversified and 
sophisticated (like China) as well as more geographically diverse, a result of U.S. trade 
sanctions (Amid & Hadjikhani, 2005; Esfahani & Pesaran, 2008)  
Other exporters that see relatively high improvements in HDI are the Southeast 
Asian nations of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These nations are three of the eight 
economies recognized for development successes in the World Bank’s East Asian 
Miracle (1993) and the focus of many more recent economic and development studies 
(e.g., Kuznets, 1988; Storm and Naastepad, 2005; Haggard, 2004; Freeman & Hew, 
2002; Page, 1994).There however remains little consensus on the specific determinants of 
this region’s success (Kwon & Kang, 2011). Nevertheless, most studies acknowledge the 
role of manufacturing and mass production for export, their reliance on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from multinational companies for capital, as well as their relatively 
cheap and well-educated labor force (Freeman & Hew, 2002).  
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Also, Turkey and Tunisia’s relatively high HDI and non-income HDI 
improvements are noteworthy because they both have average importing trade balances 
yet their increasing trend towards exportation. In the case of Turkey, economic policies 
have become more outward oriented since 1980, including the establishment of a free 
market economy, export promotion policies, and new foreign investments. The variety of 
exports has also changed, from 1990-2002 the percentage of exported agricultural and 
husbandry products, as well as mining by-products, decreased substantially, while 
industrial products greatly increased (Alici & Sengun, 2003). In Tunisia, the World Bank 
has been leading a program aimed at increasing exports and removing trade constraints, 
including export initiatives and diversification of markets and products. According to the 
World Bank (2010b), the program had increased exports by more than $400 million from 
2005 to 2009 and has created an estimated 98,500 new jobs. In particular, Tunisia has 
great export potential for health services in the Middle East and North Africa regions 
(Lautier, 2008). 
Our analysis and evidence from the literature indicate that many of the countries 
with the greatest gains in HDI (and many with the greatest gains in non-income HDI) 
from 1990 to 2010 are also nations that have, or are in the process of moving toward, 
outward oriented trade policies which involve increased domestic capabilities for 
product manufacture and export. This is not surprising since domestic manufacture can 
facilitate innovation (Eaton & Kortum, 1997; Liu, 1997; Jin, Lee, & Kim, 2008) and 
knowledge spillovers (Howells, 2001), not to mention enable employment and income, 
all of which helps to establish and sustain long-term capabilities and enhance the well-
being of communities and individuals. Studies also indicate that foreign direct investment 
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may amplify socio-economic gains in developing countries because it drives technology 
transfers from more developed nations, but only if there is adequate absorptive capacity 
of the technologies in the host country (Borensztein, Gregorio, & Lee, 1998).  Of course 
not all countries can realistically export their way to high HDI, as other factors certainly 
play a role in a nation’s ability to transform direct benefits from exports into human 
development gains, including the government’s involvement in trade policies, quality 
institutions, strong and able leadership, the diversification and sophistication of export 
products and markets, as well as an educated and skilled labor force. Maintaining a 
balance between open trade policies and protection of domestic interests appears to be 
critical for success (Lee and Mathews, 2010). 
South Africa’s results in particular indicate that outward oriented trade is not 
sufficient for socio-economic advancement. Social, economic and political challenges 
within these nations likely have impeded any human development benefit that would 
have otherwise accrued in these nations from CO2 trade. South Africa’s abolition of 
apartheid in 1990 played a role in HDI increases through the mid-1990’s, but challenges 
such as high unemployment (Arora & Ricci, 2006; Kingdon & Knight, 2005), and the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic (Youde, 2007; Stephenson 2009) have contributed to declines in 
HDI more recently. Nearby Zimbabwe (a net importer) experienced a decline in HDI 
from 1990 -2010. Although the country also faces a severe epidemic of HIV/AIDS, the 
major decline in HDI is likely due to the country’s land reforms (land was forcibly 
redistributed from whites to blacks starting in 2000), which lead to a sharp decline in 
agricultural exports and a severe currency shortage and hyperinflation (Matondi, 2002; 
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Richardson, 2004).  The country also has sanctions imposed by the US and the EU due to 
human right abuses and other government actions (Vines, 2012). 
The LDC nations of Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia are all relatively CO2 
intense net importers with average to relatively modest gains in HDI. They are also the 
countries that receive the most Official Development Assistance (ODA) among the 
nations examined. On average, 35% of Mozambique’s GNI was from ODA, followed by 
Malawi at 24%, and Zambia at 21% over the 1990 to 2010 time period (World Bank, 
2013b), interestingly the same order as their magnitude in HDI changes. The received 
ODA has undoubtedly enabled these countries to import goods and services 
manufactured in other nations. For example, Malawi imports just under 70% of the goods 
and services it consumes from South Africa, the Middle East, India, China, and other 
countries (Davis et al., 2011). These nations depend on both foreign aid and imported 
goods for their livelihoods, which is arguably well below satisfactory standards. All three 
nations remain below 0.5 HDI levels in 2010.  
Our examination of Polity scores of nations reveals some surprising insights into 
the types of institutions that may facilitate HDI advancements among underdeveloped 
nations, in particular. One would hypothesize that HDI improvements would tend to 
accrue more effectively in nations with democratic institutions, since public participation 
in elections and inherent checks and balances in the system ought to promote quality 
institutions that protect human and civil rights. This is precisely the dominate approach to 
development thinking which is echoed in many theoretical and empirical investigations 
(e.g., Lipset 1959, Pourgerami, 1988; Hurd, 1990). Yet others suggest that democracy is a 
luxury that can only be afforded after development is accomplished (e.g., De Schweinitz, 
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1959, La Palombara, 1963; Leftwich, 1993). According to Huntington and Nelson (1976, 
23), “political participation must be held down, at least temporarily, in order to promote 
economic development”. Figure 14 shows evidence for the latter, that autocractic 
governments are associated with greater HDI gains in underdeveloped nations from 
1990-2010.  Marshall and Cole (2011) explain this finding in part by the fact that 
autocracies, although very different from democratic governance strategies, do have 
similar capacities to maintain central authority in terms of articulating uniform policy 
agendas and managing near term political dynamics, such as deep conflict between social 
groups. However, they also note that autocracies are more vulnerable to armed 
insurrections and separatism over the longer-term (Marshall & Cole, 2011, pg. 10). Note 
that many Africa nations included in this research decolonized relatively recently 
(following World War II, in the 1950’s and 1960’s), which is reflected in the less stable 
forms of government exhibited by many of these nations in Figure 14. We reason that a 
strong central government (whether it is democratic or autocratic) will have a greater 
ability to balance domestic interests with foreign investments, relative to less stable 
institutions, during the development process.   
Regardless of the governance structure, it is clear that important for sustainable 
development. It is not only a mechanism for resiliency against external shocks (e.g., 
market prices, natural disasters, conflict), but it is also a driver of technological 
innovation and diffusion, as well as a means of maintaining diversity and competitiveness 
within the world market. We reason that the countries with domestic manufacturing 
capabilities, especially those that can enhance their capabilities through foreign 
investments, will not only experience an easier transition toward renewable energy 
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technologies but will perhaps play a significant role in its development. However, the 
reality is that under current technology constraints, outward oriented development 
strategies mean increases in domestically generated CO2, which conflicts with global 
climate policy.  
Empirical evidence presented in this research indicates that the ability to emit CO2 
is at least a co-requisite in the export oriented development strategies of nations that 
attained the greatest gains in HDI from 1990-2010. Moreover, evidence in the literature 
support the notion that countries that do have domestic manufacture for export 
capabilities are more likely to self-sustain future development advances. Therefore, we 
reason that CO2 limitations on underdeveloped nations will inhibit the potential gains 
from outward oriented trade policies. This is especially true if the CO2 emission reduction 
targets for developing economies are based on current or past trends in domestic 
emissions, as was the case in allocating emission rights under Kyoto based on 1990 
emission levels. That is, the method of CO2 allocation rights in future climate policy is 
critical to development progress, since it will determine (and could potentially 
perpetuate) the location of major exporting processes.  
Our concern is therefore primarily directed towards low developed nations that 
have yet to establish their niche in the world economy, many of which reside in Sub-
Sahara Africa. For them, escaping the poverty trap and establishing self-sustained growth 
will require outside help  in building their domestic capabilities (such as infrastructure, 
institutions and human capital) through increased ODA and trade reforms appropriate for 
the region before they can benefit from market-based sustained growth (Sachs et al., 
2004). Once their capabilities are sufficient, our research indicates that their best hope is 
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to invest in export oriented development strategies, which will undeniably result in 
increased CO2 emissions. Therefore, to maintain development as a priority in future 
climate policy, it may be necessary for the UNFCCC to adjust past methods of 
determining emission targets and/or limitations if both developed and developing nations 
have legally-binding restrictions. We recommend that emission allocation should involve 
emission reductions among the already developed nations (e.g., nations with HDI greater 
than 0.8) and consideration for future human development needs in underdeveloped 
nations (e.g., nations below 0.8 HDI), which includes the ability to self-sustain export-
oriented, and CO2 generating, processes.  
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Abstract  
Defined as an economic problem, the traditional approach to addressing climate 
change is to reduce the cost of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation through market-based 
mechanisms, which enables an economically efficient allocation of emissions. However, 
from a human development perspective the market-based approach to emission allocation 
might not be appropriate, considering the value it places on social well-being. Therefore 
this research builds on previous empirical work to provide a framework for 
conceptualizing the relationship between CO2 and human development. The framework 
enables a critical examination of policy prescriptions that employ market-based methods 
for emission allocation in their ability to address human development inequities. Lastly, 
we offer a novel climate policy proposal aimed at preventing unintended human 
development consequences that satisfy the following three criteria: 1) places the greatest 
restrictions on the most developed nations, 2) restrictions placed on underdeveloped 
nations are based on future human development need, and 3) emissions trading is 
prohibited between countries of different development levels. 
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Introduction 
As Sunita Narain, director of India’s Society for Environmental Communications, 
pointed out in a recent lecture, “no country has de-linked economic growth from CO2 
emissions”. Thus, the relationship between economic growth (e.g., in terms of gross 
domestic product or gross national income) and CO2 is understood to be more or less a 
direct relationship (Figure 15), although the existence of an ‘Environmental Kuznets 
Curve’ (the notion that nations reach a turning point in their economic development that 
enables emission reductions from efficient infrastructure and environmental controls) is 
still debated (e.g., Steinberger, Roberts, Peters, & Baiocchi,2010; Borhan, Ahmed, & 
Hitam, 2012; Stern, 2010).  Either way, the interdependencies between CO2 and 
economic growth are problematic for developing nations, given that efforts to stabilize 
the climate system will undoubtedly place limits on emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), a 
major GHG contributing to global warming. Defined as an economic problem, the 
traditional approach to addressing climate change (and other environmental pollution 
issues) is to reduce the cost of GHG mitigation through market-based mechanisms such 
as emissions trading or a carbon tax. This enables an economically efficient allocation of 
emissions, since parties that can make significant reductions inexpensively will, and 
those that find reductions too expensive will instead pay for their right to emit. 
More recent development and policy studies look more broadly at the relationship 
between CO2 and human development, which encompasses economic and social 
indicators, such as measures of health and educational attainment. Human development 
therefore considers more than the distribution of resources, but to also captures some of 
the common end-states of development progress that resources, like income, can enable 
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(Sen 1999a, 1999b; Nussbaum and Sen, 1992). These aspects are critical to consider 
in the context of climate change policy because energy-related restrictions may inhibit the 
ability of underdeveloped nations to provide essential energy services to citizens.  In fact, 
1.6 billion people (almost a third of humanity) have no electricity, and up to a billion 
more only have access to unreliable electricity networks, and consequently lack essential 
energy services for schools, health centers and income generation (Birol, 2007; United 
Nations, 2010). Thus, energy consumption and its resulting emissions are highly 
correlated with achieved human development (Alam, Bala, Huq, & Matin 1991; Alam, 
Roychowdhury, Islam, & Huq, 1998; Suarez, 1995; Pasternak, 2000; Goldenberg, 
Figure 15. Comparison between consumption-based CO2 emissions (where the 
emission generated in the production of goods and services get allocated to the 
consuming nation) and gross national income (GNI) for many nations. CO2 emission 
data provided Peters et al. (2011), GNI data downloaded from the UNDP. 
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Rovere, Coelho, 2004; Dias, Mattos, Balestieri, 2006; Martinez & Ebenhack, 2008; 
Moran, Wackernagel, Kitzes, Goldfinger & Boutaud, 2008; Sanchez, 2010; Steinberger 
& Roberts, 2010; Mechtenberg et al., 2012; Steinberger, Roberts, Peters, Baiocchi, 2012; 
Spierre, Seager, Selinger, in press). 
 In addition, Spierre et al. (in press) confirm that there are diminishing returns to 
human development (in terms of the United Nations Human Development Index or HDI) 
to increasing CO2 emissions among nations that is independent of the HDI functional 
form and inherent to the social indicators included in the index (life expectancy and years 
of schooling) (Figure 16). From a human development perspective, the usual market-
based approach to emission allocation might not be appropriate, considering the value it 
places on social well-being. Moreover, the diminishing returns to HDI from increasing 
emissions indicates that economic losses from GHG mitigation in developed nations may 
not be as critical to human development progress as an economic analysis would predict. 
This questions the viability of economic driven mechanisms to effectively address human 
development inequities around the world.  
Development Equity Concerns 
Allocating GHG emissions based on development equity has also been 
acknowledged across the ethics literature (e.g., Jamieson, 1992; Singer, 2004; Gardiner, 
2004; Shue, 1993; Lomborg, 2001; Baer, 2009). In A Theory of Justice (1971), John 
Rawls asserts that inequalities in distribution are justified only if they work to the 
advantage of, or a minimum do not harm, the worst off. In the context of climate change, 
the principle suggests that the most vulnerable populations (which are also the least 
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developed nations) should not be expected to pay for costs associated with climate 
change. It also promotes the notion that the developed countries should take the lead in 
GHG mitigation because mitigation efforts in underdeveloped countries would unfairly 
inhibit their development process, a process that was unrestricted to already industrialized 
nations. This principle is often addressed through mechanisms that transfer resources to 
developing countries (e.g., Schelling, 1998; Aldy, Orszag, & Stiglitz, 2001; Baumert and 
Goldberg, 2006).  
Not surprisingly, issues of development equity have been a major source of 
debate in recent international climate policy negotiations, as leaders grapple over the 
terms of the next climate regime. For example, the Group of Eight (including France, 
Figure 16. Comparison between consumption-based CO2 emissions and Human 
Development Index levels for many countries in 2010. CO2 data retrieved from Peters et 
al. (2011) and HDI levels are from the UNDP. 
106 
 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Russia) call 
for a 50% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, but the BASIC negotiating group 
(Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) call for much larger restrictions, based on 
principles of historical responsibility and equal entitlement to the atmosphere.  
Nevertheless, in order to keep global temperatures below a 2ºC increase, it is estimated 
that developing countries need to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% below business-as-usual 
levels by 2020 (Rogelj et al., 2010). When we consider the coupled nature of CO2 and 
human development (evident in Figure 16), these CO2 reductions will likely influence the 
socio-economic development of developing countries. Still, stabilizing the atmospheric 
GHG concentration likely depends on policy that includes all major emitters, otherwise 
developed nations like the U.S. refuse to comply. 
Global climate policy is currently led by United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which does recognize development in its principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. This principle recognizes historical 
differences in the contributions of developed and developing regions to global 
environmental problems, and differences in their respective capacities to tackle these 
problems. This was codified by the Kyoto Protocol, which set binding greenhouse gases 
emissions reduction targets for major developed countries to collectively reduce 
emissions on average by 5.2% relative to 1990 during the period of 2008 to 2012. The 
Protocol includes three flexible mechanisms that help developed nations meet their 
emission reduction targets. These include permit trading between developed nations, 
clean development mechanisms (CDMs), and joint implementation (JI). The CDM 
involves developed countries investing in sustainable development projects that reduce 
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emissions in developing countries, whereas the JI allows developed nations to work with 
other developed nations towards this effort. Kyoto was recently extended for a second 
commitment period from 2013 to 2020, which requires GHG emission reductions by at 
least 18% below 1990 levels by developed nations (UNFCCC, 2013).  
          The overall consensus is that Kyoto, although an important first step, has been 
ineffective at addressing climate change and human development challenges. CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion have grown 41% since 1990 and although 
emissions generated in developed countries have generally stabilized, emissions produced 
in the exempt developing countries have doubled (Le Quéré et al., 2009). Also, the 
UNFCCC recognizes development as a priority, yet the major finding of a review article 
in Climate Change finds that the market-based CDM does not significantly contribute to 
sustainable development in developing countries, since sustainable benefits are not 
monetized and therefore do not drive investments (Olsen, 2007). Kyoto has also been 
criticized for its priority of cost-effectiveness, which shifts the focus of negotiations away 
from ethical issues (Victor, 2001; Brown, 2002; Gardiner, 2004).  
As Kyoto approaches expiration, international climate discussions have turned to 
designing the next climate change policy regime to be implemented in 2020. The plan is 
known as the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, with an objective to develop “a 
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention and applicable to all Parties” by 2015 and to be fully implemented in 2020 
(UNFCCC, 2011). If all major emitters are included in the next climate policy regime, the 
likelihood of achieving significant mitigation is greatly increased, but it is unclear how 
development equity concerns will be addressed.  Based on existing empirical evidence, 
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we argue that unlimited market based mechanisms, which are focused primarily on 
economic efficiency, are myopic at addressing current human development inequities. 
Therefore this research builds on previous empirical work to provide a framework for 
conceptualizing the relationship between CO2 and human development. The framework 
enables us to critically examine policy prescriptions that employ market-based methods 
for emission allocation in their ability to address human development inequities. Lastly, 
we offer a novel climate policy proposal aimed at preventing unintended human 
development consequences. 
Empirical Evidence 
      Previous empirical work has begun to clarify the relationship between CO2 and 
human development. As mentioned prior, many studies recognize that per capita CO2 
emissions and human development level (in terms of the United Nations Human 
Development Index or HDI) of nations are highly correlated. Studies also recognize the 
diminishing returns to HDI as nations transition to higher levels of  per capita emissions 
(Pasternak, 2000; Martinez and Ebenhack, 2008; Mechtenberg; Spierre et al., in press). A 
sensitivity analysis on the 2010 HDI methodology shows that the diminishing returns to 
HDI from CO2 are inherent to specific development indicators (i.e., life expectancy and 
years of schooling) and not driven by the functional form of the HDI (Spierre et al., in 
press). In terms of more specific development indicators, a recent study found that high 
life expectancy can be achieved at a large range of carbon emission levels, whereas 
income is much more closely linked with carbon (Steinberger, et al., 2012). These 
findings indicate that reducing per capita income growth, as a result of a decrease in 
GHG emissions, may not necessarily mean a reduction in social welfare in developed 
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nations. 
A few studies have also looked at the comparison of CO2 emissions and HDI over 
time. Steinberger & Roberts (2010) found that HDI levels were achieved at decreasing 
levels of energy and carbon emissions among many nations from 1975 to 2005, 
suggesting a decoupling of energy and carbon. This finding is supported when individual 
development pathways are examined, since the saturation-like trend is not consistently 
detected, especially among highly developed nations (Steinberger et al., 2012; Spierre et 
al., in press). This suggests that no generalizable model of development exists for all 
nations. Nevertheless, consistent advances in HDI are found among many of the least 
developed nations (HDI below 0.5) as emissions increase over time (Spierre et al., in 
press). Thus, policies concerned about development progress should not place emission 
restrictions on these particular nations. 
Elsewhere, we have also studied the CO2 trade characteristics of underdeveloped 
nations from 1990 to 2010. We found that many of the underdeveloped countries (with an 
HDI below 0.8 in 2010) that experienced the greatest gains in HDI from 1990 to 2010 are 
also nations that have, or are in the process of moving toward, outward oriented trade 
policies that involve increased domestic capabilities for product manufacture and export. 
This indicates that the ability to emit CO2 is at least a co-requisite in the export oriented 
development strategies of nations that attained the greatest HDI improvements. Thus, 
CO2 limitations on underdeveloped nations could inhibit the potential gains from outward 
oriented trade policies. This is especially true if the CO2 emission reduction targets for 
economies in transition are based on current or historical domestic emissions, as was the 
case in allocating emission rights under Kyoto. That is, if emission limits are placed on 
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developing nations, they ought to consider the future development needs of these nations, 
which may include the ability to self-sustain export-oriented, and CO2 generating, 
processes (Spierre et al., 2013). 
A Theoretical Framework 
To help clarify the relationship between CO2 and human development we employ 
the capabilities approach, which is a theory of basic human entitlements that provides a 
standard for determining whether people possess the various capabilities necessary for 
living a genuinely human life (Sen 1999a, 1999b; Nussbaum and Sen, 1992; Nussbaum 
2000, 2006). A list of ten suggested human entitlements that societies should provide 
their citizens are provided by Nussbaum (1997) and is listed in Figure 15. The 
capabilities approach provides a framework for thinking about development in terms 
beyond those used in traditional welfare economics, where the focus is not only on the 
distribution of resources but also on what they enable people to do. For example, Sen 
(1990) observes that societies typically differ in their capacity to convert income and 
commodities into valuable human achievements. Figure 17 shows examples of 
mechanisms needed to transform income, commodities, and rights into actual 
achievements, such as communication, transportation, education, and health care. For 
example, a U.S. citizen has the right to life under the Bill of Rights, but to actually attain 
a life of normal length a person requires access to adequate and affordable health care. 
The theory of the capabilities approach inspired the creation of the HDI which includes 
measures of income distribution as well as attained health and education achievements in 
nations. 
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This research extends the theory behind the capabilities approach to conceptualize 
the knowledge gained from empirical evidence on the relationship between CO2 and 
human development. From a capabilities perspective, energy and CO2 are co-requisite for 
transforming resources into achieved human development because they enable modern 
forms of communication, transportation, education, and health care, among others. As 
Ezor
 (2009) points out, “Electricity serves as a catalyst, making other pillars of 
development—education, modern healthcare, income generating activities, etc.— eye-
sight, or physically in the fuel needed to run the car. To phrase it in a more nuanced way, 
the actual goods and commodities are not as meaningful as the achievements they can 
enable, if certain conversion capacities are available.  
This theory helps to explain our empirical evidence. According to our theory, CO2 
and human development remain highly correlated within the least developed nations of 
Figure 17. Conceptual Framework of the Capabilities Approach applied to the CO2-
Development Relationship. 
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the world, since the emissions generated to build basic infrastructure (such as roads, 
communication, and energy systems) and provide essential services (e.g., hospitals, 
schools, banks)  directly work to improve human development indicators. At the same 
time, this framework elucidates the notion that income and resources do not always lead 
to human development improvements if a society lacks the capacity to transform them 
into valuable achievements. Additionally, in the case of wealthy individuals, income can 
be used to purchase luxury goods and services (such as luxury cars, vacations, and hot 
tubs) that do not lead to improvements in human development indicators. This latter 
concept explains the diminishing returns to HDI from per capita CO2 emissions found in 
empirical studies. Next, we use the established CO2-development framework as a basis to 
critique popular market-based policy prescriptions. 
A Critical Assessment of Existing Policy Prescriptions 
A vast number of authors have written on the topic of distributive justice related 
to global climate policy. Klinksy and Dowlatabadi (2009) offer a comprehensive list of 
international climate policy prescriptions, organized by their distribution rules and how 
they define the climate change problem. Although a complete synthesis of approaches is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we aim to explain why unlimited market-based 
approaches are myopic at addressing development equities using a few examples, 
provided  our current understanding of the CO2-development relationship. 
 Equal Per Capita Allocation 
One popular proposal suggests an approach to climate justice that allocates carbon 
emissions on an equal per capita basis. From this perspective, every person has a right to 
the same level of GHG emissions, regardless of their nationality. This approach requires 
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scientific agreement on the total allowable amount of GHG emissions, divided by the 
total world population. Each country, then, would be allowed to emit the sum of their 
population times the allowable emissions per person.  (To account for population increase 
authors typically suggest that emissions caps would be based on the population to a 
negotiable baseline year). This is also an approach proposed by the BASIC negotiating 
group to determine national entitlements to emission rights, but only after cumulative 
historical emissions are taken into account. This approach is often supplemented with an 
emissions trading system, whereby countries that require more than their per capita 
allowance can buy allowances from countries that emit less (e.g., Singer, 2004; Jamieson, 
2001; Agarwal & Narain, 1991; BASIC, 2011). 
Although popular, this egalitarian approach to initial emission allocation has been 
criticized. The following criticism of Singer's One World is offered in a NY Review of 
Books commentary (Skidelsky & Joshi, 2004): 
“Even from a utilitarian perspective, substantial redistribution of wealth and 
income toward poor countries is subject to a variety of problems. Will poor countries be 
able to absorb aid productively? Will the aid reach the poor? Will it promote reliant self-
development? A particularly stark issue arises from the fact that the world’s poor (those 
living on less than $1 a day) are increasingly to be found in so-called “failed states,” 
many of them in sub-Saharan Africa—states defined not by murderous intent but by lack 
of competence to secure for their people the basic conditions of life, health, and 
education. In such states, can poverty be reduced without large-scale intervention, even a 
takeover of their government and administration? Singer is silent on these practical 
questions." 
 
 
In addition, Gardiner (2004, p584) states that, “The per capita proposal does not take into 
account the fact that emissions may play very different roles in people’s lives. In 
particular, some emissions are used to produce luxury items, whereas others are 
necessary for most people’s survival.” In extension, Shue (1993) calls for a greater 
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partitioning of necessary and unnecessary (or luxury) emissions and asserts that the 
necessary emissions (e.g. subsistence agricultural emissions) be left uncontrolled and 
protected.   
Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that CO2 does play a larger role in human 
development increases among nations with relatively low HDI. Also, the first critique 
calls attention to the capacity of impoverished nations to productively use money 
received from permit sales. As our empirical and CO2-development framework suggests, 
income from selling emission permits is not sufficient for human development 
improvements. We will come back to these key parts of our argument in a moment. 
Greenhouse Development Rights 
Another popular approach was more recently presented by Baer, Kartha, 
Athanasiou, and Kemp-Benedict (2009) called ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ 
(GDRs). GDRs consider an individual’s capacity and responsibility through the 
examination of income distributions within countries. GDRs are based on the principle 
that the poor should be spared the burdens of the climate transition, regardless of where 
they live. Baer et al. employ a development threshold; a level of welfare below which 
people should not be expected to pay for climate mitigation or adaptation. Also, Baer et 
al. offer two market-based methods of operationalizing GDRs, a global fund via a climate 
tax or a UNFCCC-style emissions trading scheme, once each nation’s contribution is 
determined via GDRs.  
Baer et al.’s focus on the sub-national level stands out among most policy 
proposals in that it offers a way to consider inequity within nations. This is especially 
appealing considering concern about the growth of a ‘global elite’, where the wealthy 
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members in many countries have more in common with each other than with the poor in 
their particular countries (Robinson and Harris, 2000). Still, applying a principle of 
individual equity to the national scale for use by the UNFCCC is problematic, as Baer et 
al. admit, since it ignores recent inaction by many developed nations despite their Kyoto 
commitments and requires roughly 25% reductions for developing nations today. These 
reductions that will not only impact the wealthy elite, but would likely mean impediments 
to human development of the poor, the individuals the proposal aims to protect. 
Regardless, our main critique of this proposal is the use of an emissions trading scheme 
to operationalize GDRs internationally.  
A Critique of an Unlimited CO2 Market 
From our perspective, these market-based suggestions provided for implementing 
the GDRs, as well as their use in global climate policy in general, undermine the 
principle of development equity. Standard neo-classical economic models are based on 
the assumption that individuals act rationally—i.e., that they want more rather than less 
of a good, and they choose options that are likely to yield the greatest satisfaction or 
utility for themselves. In the context of climate policy, this means that emitting parties 
will elect to reduce pollution in whatever way is least expensive (Becker, 1976). From 
this view, energy is a mechanism that enables the production of consumer goods and 
services that will most efficiently maximize global consumption (which according to 
neoclassical economic theory increases total utility) while complying with the global 
carbon cap. Yet, both the provided empirical evidence and our theoretical framework 
suggest that income and commodities may not be sufficient for achieving human 
development improvement, especially among nations with low HDI that lack the 
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capabilities necessary to transform commodities into achieved human development. 
As in the case of the equal per capita and the GDRs proposals, the most common 
market-based approach to emission allocation attempts to resolve the climate problem by 
proposing a rigid cap on global GHG emissions, and involves an emissions market that 
optimizes GHG allocations for greatest profitability. The primary purpose of emissions 
trading is to reduce the cost for polluters trying to comply with caps, while (secondarily) 
providing compensation to those that use less than their allowable emissions. This is the 
method used by the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Trading System. In effect, 
cap and trade approaches to climate policy will result in a system where goods are 
produced most efficiently in technically sophisticated countries and re-distributed to less 
technologically sophisticated countries through trade.   
As such, implementing this type of strategy globally will not necessarily foster 
human development, and may create additional impediments for underdeveloped nations. 
That is, countries that sell emission rights, because they are relatively less-efficient at 
production (or don’t participate in production), will have to purchase many of their 
manufactured products from the more developed nations that bought the emission rights 
in the first place. This is a ‘win-win’ scenario for industrialized nations because they do 
not only have the ability to emit more than their share (they just have to pay for 
additional rights), but they will also generate profit from the sale of the manufactured 
goods. Also, underdeveloped nations are unlikely to invest the proceeds of emissions 
permit sales in effective local human development when they can gain greater risk-
adjusted returns in more technologically sophisticated countries. As a result, revenues 
from permit sales will necessarily be directed towards increasing consumption of goods 
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(and services) that are cost-effective to import, but less likely to result in human 
development improvements.  
Our prediction is supported by an empirical comparison between changes in HDI 
from 1990 to 2010 and the net official development assistance (ODA) received by many 
countries (Figure 16). The comparison indicates that the nations receiving the most aid 
are not the nations experiencing the greatest changes in HDI.  Although we are not 
advocating for ending aid to Africa, or to other nations in need, we are saying that cash 
(in the form of aid or revenue from emission trading) is not sufficient for advancing 
human development.  
 
Figure 18. Comparison of Average Net Official Development (ODA) Received 
and Changes in HDI from 1990 to 2010. ODA data retrieved from The World 
Bank. 
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Now, let us extend the capability approach to assess the practicality of improving 
development through an emissions market using the example of water, an essential 
resource in a country’s development and to an individual’s well-being. Historically in 
developed countries, the establishment of a distribution system to disseminate potable 
water has proven critical for public health improvements (Nelson, 2001). However, for 
underdeveloped countries, access to treated water supplies is poor. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) and UNICEF (2000) estimate that, in the largest cities, those with a 
household or yard connection range from only 43% in Africa, to 77% in Asia, Latin  
America and the Caribbean. Moreover, the treatment and distribution of water is 
expensive, energy intensive, and by necessity a local process (Mintz et al., 2001).  If the 
ability of a developed country to pay for CO2 emissions exceeds that of the local 
populace in an underdeveloped country, then it is in the best short-term interest for the 
underdeveloped country to sell their extra emissions rights to the developed nation. 
However, there can be nothing gained from this transaction in terms of creating a long-
term, sustainable water supply. In other words, the income gained from permit sales will 
not increase the developing country’s capability to provide potable water to its citizens. 
Drawing upon this example and others (e.g., health care services and education), we 
reason that emissions trading is an insufficient mechanism for enhancing the capabilities 
of people living in developing countries. 
A Moral Assessment 
Sandel (2012) helps clarify our objections to an unrestricted market of CO2 
permits in a moral sense. He says that there are two kinds of arguments that resonate 
through debates about what money should and should not buy. The first is the fairness 
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objection, which points to the injustice that can arise when people buy and sell things 
under conditions of inequality or dire economic necessity. According to the fairness 
argument, market exchanges may not always be as voluntary as economists suggest and 
individuals might actually be coerced into selling something by the necessity of their 
situation. Second is the corruption argument, which is based on the degrading effect of 
market valuation and exchange of certain goods. In other words, some goods are 
corrupted if bought and sold. The corruption argument applies under both conditions of 
equality and inequality.  For example, prostitution can be placed under both categories of 
objections. Some oppose the practice because it is arguably never truly voluntary 
(fairness objection), others say the prostitution is degrading to women, regardless if they 
are forced into it or not (corruption argument). Other inalienable goods that are broadly 
accepted are things like babies and organs, both of which satisfy the fairness and 
corruption objections.   
The sale of CO2 emission rights falls under both the fairness and corruption 
categories that Sandel describes. It satisfies the fairness objection since a poor country 
would likely choose to sell their emission rights for cash to alleviate extreme poverty in 
their country, for example. If the situation were different, they may not choose to sell 
their CO2 so quickly. That is, the choice to sell emission rights is not a truly free choice if 
one of the participating countries is desperately poor. Moreover, based on Sandel’s 
description, a CO2 market between countries of varying development stages may degrade 
the value of having those rights, which speaks to the corruption objection. That is, if 
developed nations can simply buy their way out of reducing emissions, it can undermine 
the sense of shared sacrifice necessary to future global cooperation on the environment. 
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As Sandel describes it, an emissions market is like letting people pay to pollute and it 
essentially weakens the stigma attached to harming the environment. The latter argument 
applies even if the background conditions of equality are met. According to Sandel’s 
criteria, an emissions market may be a candidate for prohibition because it arguable 
satisfies both objections.  
 Here, we focus mainly on Sandel’s first point. Although we don’t disagree with 
the idea that an emissions market may corrupt (in this case weaken) the sense of 
environmental sustainability we are striving for, we realize that big emitters will likely 
not comply if there are not ways to reduce mitigation costs. Moreover, we are primarily 
concerned with the fairness objection in assessing the ability of market-based policies to 
address development inequities. We reason that placing a limit on an emissions trading 
scheme in way that prevents the poorest nations from having to choose between money 
(which in the short term could help buy basic necessities) and the right to emit (which can 
be a mechanism for development enhancement over the long-term) is justified on the 
moral grounds that the right to emit CO2 is at least a co-requisite for development in the 
least developed nations who seek development enhancement through outward oriented 
trade strategies.  
Policy Criteria 
Considering the current state of policy discussions, existing empirical evidence, 
established theoretical framework, as well as the arguments against unlimited CO2 permit 
markets, we are able to highlight three components of future international climate policy 
that will least-likely impact international human development progress, including 1) 
placing the greatest restrictions on the most developed nations, whose human 
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development is least likely to be impacted, 2) restriction placed on underdeveloped 
nations should be based on future human development need, since CO2 is at least a co-
requisite for achieving human development, and 3) emissions trading should be  
prohibited between countries of different development levels. 
Our Policy Proposal 
In extending our claims to climate policy, we are concerned about the limitations 
placed upon developing countries by emissions trading.  Both empirical evidence as well 
as the examples of the car and water availability in the context of the capability approach 
demonstrates that the accumulation of financial capital and consumer goods may be 
insufficient conditions for development. As Sachs et al. (2004) explains, escaping the 
poverty trap and establishing self-sustained growth in Sub-Sahara Africa will require 
outside help  in building their domestic capabilities (such as infrastructure, institutions 
and human capital) through increased ODA and trade reforms appropriate for the region 
before they can benefit from market-based sustained growth. Yet, unlimited cap and trade 
approaches to climate mitigation allocate CO2, a mechanism of converting resources into 
human development, to the most efficient producers rather than those most in need from 
a development perspective. This is especially troubling given that post-Kyoto policy 
discussions indicate a transition toward an emissions trading scheme between emitters at 
all development levels. Still, we recognize the reality of emissions trading in future 
climate policy for its ability to reduce mitigation costs, since it is the primary concern of 
big emitters like the U.S. whose inclusion in GHG mitigation schemes is essential.  
As a remedy, we propose using a three tiered emissions-market system to obtain 
sought global GHG reductions (see Figure 19). Tier 1 includes developed nations (e.g., 
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nations with current HDI levels above 0.8) which will have emission reduction targets 
assigned based on cumulative emission contributions since 1990 (arguably the year in 
which nations can no longer claim ignorance regarding the climate change problem). Tier 
2 includes developing nations (current HDI levels between 0.5 and 0.8) whose emission 
limitations will be based on future human development need, or emissions estimated to 
bring each nation to the 0.8 HDI level based on historical development trajectories. Tier 3 
includes the least developed nations of the world (current HDI levels below 0.5), whose 
emission limits will be calculated in the same way as Tier 2. In terms of emission trading, 
nations will only be permitted to trade within their tier until human development 
improvements enable a transition to new trading partners within the next tier (although 
some nations will likely transition around the same time). This proposal addresses all 
three policy criteria outlined previously, since developed nations in Tier 1 have the 
greatest emission restrictions, Tier 2 and Tier 3 allow underdeveloped nations some 
growth for future emissions until they reach high development status, which is about 0.8 
HDI according to the UNDP. Also, the tier thresholds allow us to prevent emission 
trading between nations with large differences in HDI. With the use of a mechanism 
similar to the CDM, our proposal could be supplemented to incentivize joint ventures 
with least developed nations that focus on capacity building. We also suggest that 
consumption-based emission inventories (which allocate generated CO2 emissions to the 
consuming nation, see Peters et a., 2011) should be used as a basis for determining 
limitations and assessing progress. In this way, emission limitations will penalize over-
consumption that does not transfer into human development but will in a sense reward 
production processes that do.  
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Under our suggested plan, the U.S. would be able to trade emission permits with 
countries like Canada, Norway, Austria, and Australia (all above the 0.8 HDI level). 
Likewise, Brazil, India, China and Indonesia would be likely emission trading partners 
(with HDI levels between 0.5 and 0.8). Also, nations like Uganda, Cambodia, 
Mozambique and Senegal (all less than 0.5 HDI levels) could transfer emissions between 
themselves if they were so inclined. This would protect less-developed nations from 
harmful competition for critical development resources.  Although less economically 
efficient, our analysis indicates that the prohibition is more developmentally efficient, 
since it will result in greater improvements in the human condition, especially in 
underdeveloped nations.  
In prohibiting emissions sales between countries of different development stages, 
we remove the incentives that restrict development.  To comply with CO2 caps, 
technologically sophisticated countries will have incentive to locate production in the 
underdeveloped countries that have the right to emit.  As such, wages (and capital 
investment) will flow to workers in the needy country.  A portion of the revenues that 
would have accrued in the underdeveloped countries will still accrue, but in the form of 
wages and investment, rather than in the form of carbon sales.  In effect, our proposal 
allows the underdeveloped countries get both development (by participating in the 
production process) and income.   
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This comes at the expense of the polluting countries, mostly through higher prices 
that result from lower production efficiencies.  However, the developed countries can 
partially mitigate these higher costs by sharing technology with the underdeveloped 
countries that can make production more efficient. This would also likely increase the 
GHG reduction potential of the plan, since it would place greater restrictions on the 
ability of the developed world to cut-emissions outside its borders, but in a way that does 
not remove the option all together.  
One opposing argument may be that limits to trade based on development equity 
only applies if enhancing development is the primary goal of every country.  Indeed, each 
nation has their own preferences and primary goals to achieve (e.g., religious goals) that 
arguably shouldn’t be dictated by others in a paternalistic sense. However I do argue that 
Figure 19. Illustration of our policy proposal, with suggested tier thresholds. 
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in terms of climate policy, because of its inherently global and collective implications, 
should be focused on development equity.  To clarify further, we do not argue that every 
nation should primarily focus on human development, but that human development 
should be the primary focus of climate policy, especially in the nations most vulnerable 
to climate change (which happen to be the least developed nations). Other goals and 
preferences that trump development goals in a particular country may still be pursued 
independently of climate policy. Aid from other countries could still be used to promote 
other ends if a country chooses, for example.  
Conclusion 
Article 1 of the United Nation’s Declaration on the Right to Develop (United 
Nations, 1986) states, “The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue 
of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, 
and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” This declaration shows the UN’s 
commitment to advance development throughout the world. Nevertheless, development 
requires access to cheap and reliable energy, which under current technological 
constraints will inevitably emit GHGs. However, the default mechanism employed by the 
U.N., and in most other international climate policy prescriptions, is an emissions trading 
scheme that is meant to efficiently allocate emissions among nations based on economic 
productivity. With the aid of existing empirical evidence and applied development theory 
we argue that an unlimited emissions market that includes both developed and developing 
nations with result in perverse human development consequences.  
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Alternatively, the proposal we offer differs from the policy arrangements offered 
by Singer, Jamieson, Baer or Kyoto in that we are criticizing traditional emissions trading 
schemes that allow big emitters to buy more emission rights from countries emitting 
much less. We argue that CO2 policies which fail to display sensitivity to the limits of 
transfer payments risk inhibiting countries from being able to exercise their right to 
develop, rather than simply consume.  By contrast, when human welfare is evaluated in 
terms of their capabilities, such as the HDI, the transfer of resources becomes less 
fungible. In other words, utilizing human development indices within climate mitigation 
trading schemes introduces parameters (such as life expectancy and education) that 
cannot be directly transferred like financial resources. Therefore, CO2 emissions trading 
among countries of varying stages of development ought to be limited on the basis that 
the right to emit is at least a co-requisite for human development. Our approach 
incorporates the appeal of placing primary responsibility of reducing emissions on 
developed countries, and therefore internalizes the external costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions, but also focuses on the importance of improved development in countries that 
are still developing. Specifically, it stresses that growth in poor countries is still essential, 
and rich countries that are already sufficiently developed will no longer be improved by 
quantitative growth, but rather by more qualitative growth (e.g., through increased social 
capital).  It is the more qualitative growth among nations that will enable reductions in 
CO2 emissions, as the focus of development shifts away from consumption.  We assert 
that this limit on emissions trading will allow production processes to occur in 
developing countries that will likely lead to more sustainable development pathways over 
the longer-term. 
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Abstract 
International climate meetings are typified by frustration over diverse mitigation 
outlooks. This is not surprising: climate change is a collective action problem; domestic 
mitigation efforts yield global benefits. To explore overlooked models of cooperation, 
we’ve created, run, and studied a non-cooperative game that examines how students at 
multiple universities manage common-pool resources. Contrary to theoretical predictions, 
we observe widespread cooperative behavior. This success is due to the moral suasion of 
ethical leaders, and we argue the importance of our findings extends beyond the 
classroom. It clarifies which countries can exert ethical leadership to facilitate enhanced 
global cooperation for significant mitigation. 
Challenges of Addressing Climate Change 
 
In late December, 2011 government officials and other representatives gathered 
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Durban, South Africa. It was the 17
th
 Conference of the Parties (COP 17) since 1994, 
when the convention entered into force. According to the United Nations (UN) the 
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notable outcomes of the meeting include the establishment of a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol, an outline to negotiate a new legal and universal 
emission reduction agreement by 2015 that would come into force in 2020, and the 
operationalization of the Green Climate Fund for climate adaptation (UNFCCC 2012; 
IISD 2011). However, this seemingly successful list of Durban’s climate achievements 
masks the complicated turmoil and frustrations expressed by participants during the 
conference. 
Political and economic impediments to cooperation are the more familiar 
narrative of international climate talks, and Durban was no exception. Many of the details 
surrounding the listed outcomes have been a source of continuing controversy between 
nations. For example, the decision on exactly when the second commitment period of 
Kyoto will end was not decided (HFW 2012). The Alliance of Small Island States pushed 
for a shorter, five-year commitment period to prevent inaction by the developed world. 
The European Union (EU) opted for an eight year period, claiming that they have already 
set domestic targets for 2020. At the same time, the low-lying nations sought deeper 
emissions cuts to contain temperature gains and resulting sea-level rises (Bloomberg 
News 2012). In addition, arguments ensued between the EU and major developing 
countries, lead by China and India, over the terms of Kyoto’s predecessor. The EU 
pushed for a globally binding agreement that would include mitigation commitments for 
major developing economies. India and China however demanded an approach that 
considers the development needs of poorer nations (Sethi 2012).  Also, funding for the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF) was not secured; at Durban only pledges were made. There is 
always the risk that countries may not fulfill their commitments, just as Canada 
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threatened to withhold contributions to the GCF unless all major polluters committed to 
binding carbon reductions (Environment Canada, 2011).  Canada, Russia and Japan 
joined the US, who has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol, in not signing up for new 
emission targets under the second Kyoto commitment period. Consequently, real 
cooperation among the world’s biggest emitters on a global mitigation framework 
remains a fantasy. 
The collective action problem vexing climate policy is by now familiar (e.g., 
Seager et al., 2011; Gardiner, 2004, 2006; Ostrom, 2010). Greenhouse gases (GHG) mix 
globally in the atmosphere and their accumulation has global impacts on the Earth’s 
climate. Efforts to abate emissions by a single country impose local costs while yielding 
globally shared benefits. Each country therefore faces incentives to free ride—to let 
others bear the costs of limiting emissions while enjoying the global benefit. Moreover, 
the uneven development and varying historical responsibility for emissions creates a 
strong ethical debate about who should bear the cost of mitigation efforts (Jamieson, 
1999; Brown, 2011; Gardiner, 2004, 2006; Broome, 2008; Singer,2004; Spierre et al. 
2010), Alas, successfully implementing a system of global compliance requires 
collective, social decision making that is unprecedented among people with radically 
different values and radically different needs (Gowdy, 2008).  
To make matters worse, foundational theories of human behavior provide scant 
insight into successful strategies for resolution of collective action problems. 
Neoclassical economic theory predicts tragedy when rational decision-makers maximize 
personal utility without enforcement by a third-party. Evolutionary biology tells us that 
cooperation is possible, but only likely when boundaries define an in-group and an 
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excluded out-group, a.k.a. evolutionary tribalism or parochial altruism (Abbink et al., 
2011; Bornstein, 2003; Choi & Bowles, 2007; Sadowski et al., 2012b). The implication is 
that global problems of collective action like climate change, which include all 
individuals without exception, are insolvable.  
In practice, however, individuals have been found to exhibit behavior that is 
inconsistent with foundational theory. For example, Elinor Ostrom (1999) provides 
examples of sustainably managed common-pool resources at the local scale without 
privatization or institutional regulation (e.g., community owned irrigation systems in 
Nepal). Moreover, David Sally (2001) points out that unlike the independent decision-
makers modeled in game theory (e.g., the prisoner’s dilemma) humans have the innate 
quality of sympathy generated through social interaction, which guides strategy 
formulation. The effect of sympathy on game-play can result in unpredicted behaviors of 
players, especially among friends, face to face interaction, and those players identified as 
having interpersonal similarities (Sally, 2001). Furthermore, reciprocity has been 
proposed as a solution to the problem of moral compliance, the problem of how moral 
norms are often in contradiction to incentives to deviate. The idea is that people living in 
close-knit groups form complex reciprocal relationships which result in linkages of 
people indirectly helping other people (Alexander, 1987; Boehm, 2012; Hume, 1992; 
Nowak, 2006, 2012; Trivers, 1971). 
Thus, contrary to many foundational theories, alternative models of cooperation 
may be available through the study of real human behavior in social settings. To identify 
potential strategies for collective action that may have been heretofore overlooked, we 
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modeled a Tragedy of the Commons problem
1
 as a non-cooperative game, called the 
Pisces Game, to investigate how students at multiple universities organize and make 
decisions about common-pool resources, in this case a fishery. Contrary to the usual 
narrative of international negotiations and the predictions of foundational theories, we 
observed cooperative—even altruistic—behaviors among students from different groups 
during game-play. 
Testing Cooperation 
 
We organized two game experiments using the Pisces Game. The first was played by 
Arizona State University (ASU) and Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) students. 
The second was played by three different classes, one from ASU and two from Mesa 
Community College (MCC). In both treatments, students were encouraged to 
communicate face to face in class and to use information communication technologies 
(ICT) outside of class and with students attending the partner university. For example, an 
online discussion board was established on the National Science Foundation funded 
website EthicsCORE (www.nationalethicscenter.org) for students to collaborate.  The 
following is a short description of the game. 
In the Pisces Game, all participants are assigned to a group based on their zodiac 
sign. Each group represents a fishing village and all the fishing villages depend on a 
common lake for sustenance. The villages take turns catching fish out of the common 
lake and make decisions about what they want to do with the fish they catch. They have 
five options: 
                                                 
1
 Garrett Hardin first described this social dilemma in "The Tragedy of the Commons", published in 
Science in 1968, which predicts that individuals acting in their own self-interest will destroy common pool 
resources in the absence of regulation, privatization or population constraints (Hardin, 1968) 
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1. Consume fish, where one fish consumed equals one point towards their grade. 
Each student must consume a minimum number fish per round for sustenance or 
they are eliminated from the game. 
2. Invest fish into building a private pond for storage and growth of a private stock 
of fish separate from the lake.  The capacity of the pond is a function of the 
cumulative total of fish invested, and subject to economies of scale
2
.  
3. Stock their private pond with fish from the common lake.  
4. Harvest fish from their private pond for consumption or gifting (see #5).  
5. Give fish caught from the lake or harvested from the pond to other groups.  
At the end of each full round of play, i.e. once every group has turn, reproduction occurs 
in both the common lake and the entire private ponds. The game proceeds for eight full 
rounds or until all of the groups can no longer eat the subsistence requirement of fish 
each round.   
The game is designed to create real tensions among participants by placing 
personal interests at odds with collective goals.  Participants are incentivized to act 
selfishly because real grade points are allotted based upon their game performance; the 
more fish a player consumes, the better their grade. It is possible for students to achieve 
an “A+” in the game, but only if they are willing to consume so many fish that they 
impoverish other players (Sadowski et al., 2012a; Seager et al., 2010). There are also 
multiple ways for collective cooperation to occur; we have observed two particular 
common strategies among students during past game tests. First, each group can curb 
                                                 
2
 In microeconomic terms, ‘Economies of scale’ refers to the reductions in unit cost as the size of the 
facility and the inputs increase. In the Pisces Game, the private pond capacity grows slowly with initial 
investments, but the size of the pond increases rapidly after significant investments are made.   
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consumption to allow growth of fish––either in the common lake on in ponds––to ensure 
that all groups have equal, long-term access to resources.  For these particular 
experiments, the game was calibrated so that a minimal consumption and individual 
investment strategy could lead to a grade of about a “C+” for every player. Second, 
groups could strategically invest as much as possible in just a few private ponds in select 
villages, thereby capturing economies of scale. The villages that tended these collective 
ponds would distribute the harvested fish to every group during the last round of the 
game, enabling consumption and a grade of about a “B+” or “A-“ for each group. One 
challenge in the game was discovering these strategies, as they were not revealed to the 
students by the instructors.  
Both strategies could be discovered, but difficult to implement for multiple 
reasons.   Players would not only have to overcome their tribalistic attitudes towards 
other groups (predicted by evolutionary biology theory, see Sadowski et al. 2012b), but 
also work through the transaction costs (Coase, 1960) involved in coordinating one of 
these cooperative plans. Ostrom (2010) offers a comprehensive list of likely determinants 
of collective action and how they are posited to affect results from wider literature. In 
general, as both the number and diversity of participants increase, the likelihood of 
achieving collective action has been found to decrease. Also, the amount of trust and the 
reputation of participants from former actions play a critical role in how individuals 
behave in a group setting. Ostrom also explains that face-to-face interaction is the 
preferred medium to increase the likelihood of cooperation.  
The first game treatment had 48 students between ASU and RIT that were from a 
wide-range of degree programs and included both undergraduates and graduate students. 
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The second had a total of 118 students in three undergraduate engineering classes at ASU 
and MCC. During game-play it was likely that if one or more of the groups deviated from 
collective plan their reputation would be tarnished and the other groups would be 
unlikely to trust them for the remainder of the game (Milinski et al., 2002). And, although 
our students were able to communicate face to face with their classmates during parts of 
the game, communication across universities and outside of class occurred through digital 
ICT.   
To determine the extent to which students cooperate during game-play, we 
observe the students’ deliberation, and review their public statements of intent. These are 
compared to actual decisions and behaviors during the game, individual final game 
grades, and overall group outcome. For example, if the groups’ interactions suggested the 
desire for an egalitarian outcome, but their actual decisions resulted in inequality, we 
would presume the group was not mutually cooperative. Indeed, studies show that ethical 
judgments are only weakly related to actual ethical behaviors (Rest et al., 1999; Hannah 
et al., in press). At the end of each treatment we moderated class discussions and, if 
necessary, spoke to individual players so as to better understand the students’ motivations 
during the game. Next, we will briefly describe the two game experiments. 
Treatment 1: ASU & RIT 
In the first treatment, gameplay was asynchronous; the classes met on different 
days and at different times. The ASU class played the first four rounds (first generation), 
then RIT inherited the model from ASU (second generation) to finish the remaining four 
rounds. In this treatment each village was required to consume a minimum of four fish 
per village to sustain themselves until the next round and all players belonging to one 
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zodiac sign received the same grade at the end of eight rounds, regardless of the 
university in which they were enrolled. Thus, all zodiac villages were required to make 
collective decisions, but only those players at one university (at a time) had the authority 
to decide. The ASU play happened in one three-hour class period, with no prior 
experience with the game model. RIT play followed two days later, and players at both 
Universities were permitted to communicate via EthicsCORE during the time between 
game play decisions. This means RIT players had more time to experiment and benefit 
from the ASU players’ experience, but were also more constrained in their options (by 
inheriting the choices the ASU players had already made, without the RIT players’ 
knowledge). 
The ASU students decided to cooperate and do their best to supply RIT with the 
means to achieve an equitable grade outcome. They reasoned that the just strategy would 
be to ensure that everyone had a chance to earn the same grade. Unfortunately, because 
the ASU students had limited time and failed to understand the mechanics of the game 
right away, they left their RIT counterparts with a relatively depleted fishery. The second 
generation was less than pleased with their inheritance of fish. One student in particular 
questioned the lack of planning on the part of ASU that resulted in “a far from optimal 
first half” that couldn’t be fixed. ASU responded that the RIT players were being 
insensitive to the limited time and experience they had with the game.  
Meanwhile, it was discovered that there was a zodiac sign represented at RIT that 
was not present at ASU. RIT discussed a plan that would capitalize on this discovery and 
“punish” ASU for their earlier mistakes. The strategy was to give all their points to this 
‘extra’ group in the last round and then redistribute the points back to the RIT players 
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after the game. In this way no points would be left for ASU students. There was rampant 
disagreement amongst the RIT groups on how to proceed with the game. Some groups 
wanted to remain amiable and cooperative, while others opted to earn a high grades, even 
if that meant harming everybody else. ASU acted quickly to try to persuade RIT to act 
cooperatively via ICT and save their grades from RIT’s revenge. Luckily, one player at 
RIT devised and disseminated a strategy that could be implemented by the second 
generation that would salvage the game and earn everyone a decent grade. No one 
publicly contested the plan and the second generation of RIT students seemed ready to 
implement it during class.  
However, during class one group at RIT unexpectedly deviated from the 
collective plan and over consumed fish. The dissenters argued that the master plan was 
too technical for them to verify and therefore required blind obedience by the less 
mathematically savvy members of the class
3
. Arguments and accusations overwhelmed 
the class, so much so that the class was dismissed early to allow players to calm down. 
Heated discussions however continued online between the RIT students, unbeknownst to 
ASU. The cooperative players contested the behavior by the dissenting group and began 
thinking about ways to retaliate.  Instead, another group (who had the second highest 
stock of fish, second to the dissenters) altruistically decided to donate all their fish to the 
dissenting group. They reasoned that this act would reveal their true moral fiber because 
they would have to decide between giving away their fish to uphold their stated principle 
of democracy, or be exposed for acting selfishly by keeping the fish for themselves. The 
decision by the dissenters would make or break the outcome of the game and ultimately 
                                                 
3
 Later on, the dissenting group admitted that they deviated from the plan because they thought that the 
cooperative solution was ‘boring’ and instead they wanted to make the game more interesting. 
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be the difference between successful cooperation and moral failure (not to mention good 
or bad grades for most players).  
In the end, the dissenters committed to the greater ethical principle that the class 
sought and distributed the fish equally among all groups. But the drama wasn’t over; 
when ASU found out about what happened, and despite the positive outcome, 
complained that their grades were put on the line by RIT without their consent. RIT 
responded by producing a video message to ASU, explaining their actions and why ASU 
was not included in the discussions. All groups avoided disaster and ended up achieving 
group cooperation––even in the face of an unusual conflict.   
Treatment 2: ASU & MCC 
In the second treatment, game-play took place on a single day over two class 
periods.  The first class at MCC (first generation) met earlier in the day and played the 
first four rounds of the game. A few hours later the second class at MCC and the ASU 
class (second generation) met simultaneously and inherited the model from the first 
generation of players.  The size of the lake was recalibrated to anticipate an explosion of 
players during the second generation, so the comparatively smaller first generation could 
potentially consume as many fish as they could in without exhausting the lake during 
their four rounds of play (although this would risk impoverishing the later classes). Since 
the second generation classes at ASU and MCC were scheduled to meet at the same time, 
they were required to discuss and make decisions in real time via chat windows on 
EthicsCORE. In this treatment, we required consumption of four fish per player. Thus, 
larger villages were disadvantaged compared to smaller groups.  Also, students were 
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graded individually in this treatment and earned points for the fish they personally 
consumed. 
A similar dynamic to Treatment 1 occurred during this game. The first generation 
at MCC devised a long-term cooperative plan based on limiting consumption and 
investment in collective ponds for capturing economies of scale. Their plan was to 
sacrifice their own grades (down to an 80%) by limiting their consumption, so as to 
ensure that the second generation could earn “A” grades. This strategy was remarkable 
given that the first generation had no interaction with the second generation and would in 
no way benefit from this choice to behave altruistically towards the other classes. 
Unfortunately, a clerical error in the way that they reported their final round of decisions 
resulted in a catastrophic destruction of fish (by stocking the private ponds beyond their 
capacity). The second generation of students at ASU and MCC discovered the error in the 
middle of their first round of play, after several villages had already entered consumption 
decisions predicated on a false impression of how many fish remained in the lake. The 
accidental destruction of the fish meant that grade expectations of the second generation 
were significantly reduced. Instructor’s let the error stand, reasoning that population 
surveys are imperfect, ecological models are often incorrect, and that decisions must be 
made today under the constraints imposed by mistaken decisions in the past. 
This unforeseen incident caused the second generation to blame their ‘ancestors’ 
and reconsidered their initial cooperative intentions. Several students at ASU closed their 
laptop computers, as if to disengage from the game. However, the tone and location of 
leadership changed in response to the new challenge––particularly at ASU. One student 
argued that the point of the lesson was not to test the students’ ability to manipulate the 
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model correctly, but to test their moral aptitude, and that giving up now would be to fail 
the moral challenge. He asked the technical leaders in the class to reopen their laptops 
and find a new optimal solution, given the new constraints. Despite an increase in the 
conflict, both classes in the second generation successfully coordinated decisions at each 
village to achieve an egalitarian outcome. 
The uniform cooperation amongst every group from both universities came as a 
surprise. There were strong incentives for the groups to compete with each other over the 
scarce resources. Yet, the players demonstrated collective action and, per their intended 
plan, allocated grade points among players in an equitable fashion. 
Cooperation through Moral Leadership 
In our observations, we noticed an important factor for achieving collective 
action. The devised strategies and group decisions were often centered around a few 
active individuals who took on the role of ethical leaders. They were players that 
emerged as outgoing and trustworthy individuals that voluntarily advised and directed 
their own group’s actions as well as influenced other groups to follow suit. They 
encouraged collective deliberation to determine what ends the group should work 
towards. They gained authority with others through their significant contributions to 
decisions that resulted in the cooperative ends being realized. Moreover, they employed 
altruistic and moral arguments for the outcomes and behaviors they sought from the 
group. In particular, these leaders were crucial during the online discussions amongst the 
groups.  
Social cognitive theory (SCT) helps to explain why and how ethical leaders 
influence their followers. SCT is based on the idea that individuals learn by observing 
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and emulating attractive and credible models of values, attitudes and behaviors (Hannah 
et al., in press; Brown &Trevino 2006; Brown et al. 2005; Mayer et al. 2009). Ethical 
leaders are likely sources of guidance because their appeal and credibility as role models 
draw attention to their modeled behavior. They are characterized as honest, caring, and 
principled individuals who make fair and balanced decisions. They also frequently 
communicate with their followers about ethics, and set clear ethical standards (Brown & 
Trevino, 2006; Avolio & Luthans, 2006; Walumbwa et al., 2008). Drawing from SCT, 
social learning through observing moral exemplars will enhance observers’ moral 
cognitions and also their moral courage, the ability to sacrifice or risk one’s individual 
interests in order to uphold personal moral principles (Lester et al., 2009; Walker & 
Henning, 2004). When leaders signal that followers should stand up and act in line with 
their values, thus showing moral courage, and the leader consistently demonstrates 
similar behavior, followers are more likely to emulate moral courage (Hannah et al. 
2005). It could be that the more introvert and/or ethically inexperienced members of the 
class looked to the emerging ethical leaders in the game for guidance on how to navigate 
the unfamiliar problem they confronted in the game. Because the guidance originated 
with the morally minded students, they may have inspired the cooperative actions and 
outcomes observed among groups.  
To investigate this postulation in our game experiments, we plotted the number of 
online responses contributed by each student for both treatments, shown in Figure 1. Both 
plots show that most of the contributions to the group were made by just a few active 
individuals.  The sloping trend line on each graph is a power law equation fitted to the 
data for each treatment. Notice the high R
2
 values for both sets of data (0.9512 and 0.88), 
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which indicates that the power function represents the experimental data quite well. The 
observed power-law relationship of contributions is indicative of student leadership, at 
least in terms of participating in online discussions. This relationship is consistent with 
the Pareto Principle, in which “80% of the consequences typically stem from 20% of the 
causes” (Bunkley, 2008). In this case the consequence was group cooperation, and the 
cause could be the moral persuasion of ethical leaders in the group. 
As instructors, we were able to examine the context of the posts and link the most 
active online contributors to particular students in our classes. Indeed, those students who 
posted the most on the discussion boards were the very leaders that coordinated the 
actions of others in the game. For example, the player that contributed the most online in 
the first treatment was a major influence on how RIT proceeded with the game after ASU 
played the first four rounds.  
This active player argued for a utilitarian strategy that, in his opinion, was 
hindered greatly by the actions of ASU. He emphasized the need for ASU to realize the 
implications of their behavior on others. He also was the first to push for an egalitarian 
outcome that would result in the same but highest grade possible for everyone; he spent 
hours devising a step-by-step plan that his generation could follow.  This student leader 
however was unwilling to sacrifice moral principles to achieve higher grades for 
everyone; when RIT was encouraged by ASU to misrepresent the number of zodiac signs 
in the RIT class to maximize everyone’s grade, he responded by discussing the moral 
implications of acting in such a way. He wrote the following on EthicsCORE, “In an 
effort to gain trust of most people, my basic plan has been transparency and democracy. 
The whole class seemed uncomfortable with lying so democratically it would have failed 
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and any lying spits in the face of transparency. If we are willing to lie about teams this 
game, who knows what that will lead to next game.” From the beginning, this player was 
an ethical leader, whose strong vocal communication influenced the ultimate game 
outcome.
4
 
 
 
Figure 20.  The numbers of online responses contributed by each student are plotted for 
both Treatment 1 (top) and Treatment 2 (bottom). A power law trendline is fitted to the 
data on both plots. We found that most of the contributions to the group’s online 
communication were made by a few relatively active individuals. 
                                                 
4
 When the active player’s plan was subverted during game-play, his ethical leadership was called into 
question. The dissenters claimed that the student’s plan was technocratic and that he was instilling an ethos 
of group think. This points out the risk that ethical leaders take when they display acts of moral courage; 
they are subject to being misinterpreted by those around them. We reason that the group who subverted his 
plan was incorrect in their accusations. The problem of group-think or technocracy wasn't really present, 
given the student’s public display of a solution and how he offered step-by-step instructions for each group 
to follow. Also, the deviant group admitted later-on that the initial reason that they resisted cooperation was 
to “make the game more interesting”.  
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In general, the online contributions by the most active players seemed to greatly 
influence the strategies that lead to the cooperative solutions in both treatments. That is, 
they influenced the disparate groups to cooperate with each other instead of taking the 
free-rider approach to the problem or resorting to economic rationality or evolutionary 
tribalism. Furthermore, in the case of multi-university play, influence exerted by these 
leaders involved communicating through digital ICT, rather than face-to-face appeals. 
This is significant given the emphasis placed on face to face communication in achieving 
positive outcomes in collective action experiments (Ostrom, 2010; Sally, 1995).  The 
implication is that the difficulty of achieving cooperation over geographical distances 
may be alleviated through electronic communication (Axelrod et al., 2002). Digital ICT 
may be a tool that can help to reduce the transaction costs of international collaboration 
and perhaps aid the achievement of collective action. 
It could also be that the relative role or position of the ethical leader in the game is 
significant in the moral persuasion of followers. The student described above, who was 
very influential in coordinating the actions during the ASU and RIT game was in the 
Gemini group, which is the third sign in the zodiac calendar. This means that the student 
not only argued for cooperation on the moral grounds of fairness, but also sacrificed the 
potential opportunity he had to take advantage of his relative position in the game. Had 
the student been a member of one of the later groups, the plea for equity may not have 
been as influential and could have been perceived as a selfish act. This is because the 
later groups in the zodiac calendar (i.e., Aquarius and Pisces) are the last groups to fish 
from the common lake in each round; they have a disadvantage in terms of the number of 
fish available to catch when/if the common lake becomes depleted. Even if these 
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disadvantaged players provide sound moral arguments for a particular strategy, they also 
have personal incentives to argue for egalitarian outcomes that may offer them a higher 
grade than they could achieve independently. Therefore, only the students with a relative 
advantage can exhibit true acts of moral courage, because they are personally taking a 
risk for a greater moral principle.  
 
Moral Leadership and Society 
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to make the distinction between ethical 
leadership and positional leadership. Holding a formal leadership position or position of 
power does not necessarily mean that a person exercises true leadership. People in 
leadership positions may exercise force or authority using only their position and the 
resources and power that come with it. For example, Ciulla (2004) discusses “the Hitler 
problem”, the idea of considering Hitler as a great leader because of his profound 
influence over history. However, any definition of leadership that includes moral 
considerations would not consider Hitler a leader at all (Ciulla, 2004). According to 
Burns (1978), true leadership “induces followers to act in accord with the values and the 
motivations of both leaders and followers and where they raise one another to higher 
levels of morality.” It is the latter type of ethical leadership we observed making a 
difference in games and are interested in exploring further. The implication is that this 
type of leadership may induce cooperative actions for the greater good among groups 
with competing interests, even among leaders at the international scale.    
To consider the potential implications at the global scale, we need to first think 
about how differences in culture may impact peoples’ perceptions of what makes an 
ethical leader. Fortunately, Resick et al. (2006) studied qualities of ethical leadership 
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across more than fifty nations. Using data from the global leadership and organizational 
effectiveness (GLOBE) project Resick and colleagues measured four dimensions of 
ethical leadership: character/integrity, altruism, collective motivation and encouragement. 
They found that these four dimensions were universally supported, but the degree to 
which each component was endorsed varied across cultures. Furthermore, studies show 
little to no relationship between leader demographics (i.e., sex, race, gender) and ethical 
leadership (Brown & Trevino, 2006; Walker, 1985; Rest 1986; Thoma, 1984). This is 
good news for the prospect of using ethical leadership to influence positive collective 
action at the larger scale because there seems to be a general consensus on the qualities 
that an ethical leader should possess that is unbiased towards a person’s nationality or 
inborn characteristics. 
Perhaps one of the most well-known examples of effective moral leadership at the 
international scale is Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi led the struggle for independence of India 
against British colonialism, against the caste system, and to oppose the maltreatment of 
women. With a commitment to nonviolent action and truth, Gandhi sought justice, human 
rights, and democracy. He was truly an ethical leader because he emphasized how the 
moral courage needed to uphold non-violence as a tool of protest was much greater than 
the one needed to strike back in a violent way. His broader influence resulted from 
African American leaders who traveled to India to learn from Gandhi about how to create 
power without the urge for revenge. Eventually, Gandhi’s insights influenced Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and motivated his approach to non-violent activism for racial equality. 
Furthermore, the techniques of Gandhi and King have been employed successfully by 
people in recent popular movements including the Poles, East German, Czechs and 
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Slovaks, the Burmese, Palestinians, Guatemalans, and Thais (King 1999). But, do we 
have a modern day ethical leader like Gandhi, not motivated by personal interests but by 
the greater good, available to act as a moral exemplar for the leaders of the 195 member 
countries in the UNFCCC? 
 
Ethical Leadership in the UNFCCC 
 
Unlike the exemplar leadership Gandhi and King, leadership at representative 
international meetings is much more complicated than the personal moral standards 
and/or commitments of the individual delegate.  Each representative embodies the values 
and principles, as well as the judgments resulting from historical decisions, of their 
respective nation or organization. Thus, ethical leaders that embody such characteristics 
like integrity, transparency, and altruism at the climate negotiations yet represent 
historically uncooperative and untrustworthy parties will likely not emerge as the 
influential agent of collective action. In the context of international climate policy, 
potential ethical leaders may be representatives of nations that are respected by both 
developed and developing nations for things like justice, equality, and human rights. 
Particularly for climate change negotiations, an ethical leader would be committed to 
showing national moral courage by fulfilling their nation’s obligations to others (in terms 
of mitigation and/or financial support) despite what other nations do and at the risk of 
domestic interests. 
Considering the outcomes of past climate negotiations, ethical leadership is 
improbable to emerge from the likes of the United States, Russia, Canada, or Japan. 
These nations have been resolute in their unwillingness to commit to GHG emission 
reduction unless other major world economies do so as well (HFW, 2012). The reason for 
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this position, they say, is that reductions in emissions will not be politically feasible (i.e., 
in the U.S. it is unlikely to get ratified by Congress) if those reductions place the nation at 
an economic disadvantage. This is considered to be an immoral act because these 
countries are approaching negotiations as if their national self-interests trump their global 
responsibilities to protect people around the world and the natural resources on which life 
depends (Brown, 2011). In fact, it is a contradiction to moral courage, which in this 
context refers to one’s willingness to risk domestic interests in order to fulfill obligations 
to others.  
One might argue that countries like the United States may not be acting 
immorally if they reason that they do not have any moral obligation to others in the 
context of anthropogenic climate change. Markowitz & Shariff (2012) found evidence 
from behavioral and brain science that individuals may not be well inclined to identify 
climate change as an important moral imperative because it fails to generate strong moral 
intuitions in the same way that other moral imperatives do. However, some American 
leaders have publicly admitted responsibility. Former Vice President Al Gore, who was 
awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 for his book An Inconvenient Truth, has 
emphasized that reversing the effects of climate change is a moral imperative and that 
ignoring the problem will imperil future generations. In a 2010 speech he said, “Make no 
mistake, this is not just a political issue, not just a market issue, not just a national 
security issue, not just a jobs issue; It is a moral issue” (Wang 2010). Also, Senator John 
Kerry, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said the following in a senate floor 
speech this past June, 
“The plain fact is that there isn’t a nation on the planet that has escaped 
the steady onslaught of climate change. When the desert is creeping into 
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East Africa, and ever more scarce resources push farmers and herders 
into deadly conflict, then that is a matter of shared security for all of us. 
When the people of the Maldives are forced to abandon a place they’ve 
called home for hundreds of years—it’s a stain on our collective 
conscience, and a moral challenge to each of us. When our own 
grandchildren risk growing up a world we can’t recognize and don’t want 
to, in the long shadow of a global failure to cooperate, then—clearly, 
urgently, profoundly—we all need to do better” (Smith 2012). 
 
The realization by some national leaders that climate change is an ethical issue, yet 
persistent in-action in addressing responsibility substantiates the perception of 
immorality. 
Much like the US, Canada openly opposes the second commitment period of 
Kyoto because it exempts the major developing economies of the world from emission 
reduction targets. A nation that was applauded for its ethical stance in the 1980’s when it 
fought the apartheid system has now been accused of abandoning its moral leadership in 
Durban. Canada has tried to promote the oil sands as the ‘ethical oil’5 option in the past, 
but critics say that it cannot make the argument by being silent. Canadian representation 
kept a low profile at the conference, and stuck to its position of opposing Kyoto. Whereas 
other countries offered video messages and had pavilions in the Durban Exhibition 
Center, Canada did not even have a small booth on display. Because of the country’s no 
effort diplomacy, many countries have stopped perceiving Canada as a negotiating 
partner (York 2012). In this way, Canada has become a bystander in the current climate 
negotiations; in terms of showing moral courage or ethical leadership in the UNFCCC, 
Canada would be more accurately described as morally disengaged. 
                                                 
5
 In a book entitled ‘Ethical Oil: The Case for Canada’s Oil Sands’, Ezra Levant makes the case for 
exploiting Canada’s oil sands in terms of four criteria: the environment, conflict, economic and social 
justice, and freedom of oppression. He says that in these terms, the Canadian petroleum industry is much 
more ethical that other crude producers like Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela (Lezra 2010).  
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We also can look at the quality of ethical leadership for other major players in the 
climate negotiations. The EU, backed by the small island states, came to Durban with a 
plan to convince the developing nations, mainly the major economies like India and 
China, to agree to a forward-looking approach that would place legally binding emission 
targets on all countries, regardless of historical responsibility.  The small-island states 
backed the EU because their priority is to attain deeper emission cuts to contain the 
temperature increases, thus sea-level rise, that is already inundating their coasts. The 
island alliance understandably called for a shorter, five-year second commitment period 
to Kyoto given their preference for more urgent reductions, but the EU opted for an eight 
year period that more conveniently aligned with already determined domestic targets. The 
position of the EU, although arguing for a system that would likely result in more 
significant reductions overall, is perceived as inequitable by the developing countries 
because it would place less responsibility on the industrialized nations compared to a 
situation that determines obligations based on historical emissions. Moreover, the EU’s 
argument for a more extended commitment to Kyoto than desired by the islands, 
questions the moral integrity of the European countries further. 
India’s Union environment minister, Jayanthi Natarajun, has been admired for 
“standing up” to the developed world, using ethical arguments to justify the nation’s 
position. India demanded that the principle of equity -- in terms of historical 
responsibility and human development considerations– remain intact in the new climate 
regime. Other developing countries supported India, including China and countries like 
Pakistan, Philippines and Egypt. They demanded a more equitable mitigation system that 
would secure development space for the poorer nations, even under their increased 
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obligations under the post-Kyoto climate regime.  China’s minister, Xie Zhenhua, stood 
up in support of India’s position saying, “What qualifies you to tell us what to do? We are 
taking action. We want to see your actions” (Sethi, 2011). Indeed, both China and India 
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and although are exempt from binding emission limits, 
they are the largest sources of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits
6
 (UNEP 
2012). Also, both nations have reduced their emissions growth rates significantly over the 
past few decades (C2ES, 2002). 
It is reported that after many hours of negotiations in Durban, the chair was forced 
to adjourn the meeting and requested that the EU and India find a compromise. Other 
countries like China and the U.S. huddled around India’s representatives to determine a 
statement that would offer the world cooperation towards a new climate regime, but using 
language that did not lock in any of the countries to future commitments they weren’t 
prepared to make. The countries decided “to launch a process to develop a protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” (HFW 2012). Although 
the specific details of how the new climate regime will address both sides of the issue, it 
is said that India showed great leadership by bringing considerations of equity back into 
the discussion and gained respect from many developing countries in the G77+China 
group for remaining committed to their position (Sethi, 2011). But can we consider India 
an ethical leader in the UNFCCC negotiations? 
Many accounts of the happenings at Durban applaud India for its role in keeping 
equity a priority in the next climate regime. However, India’s Jayanthi Natarajun did not 
                                                 
6
 The CDM grants emission credits for verified reductions in developing countries, which can be used by 
developed countries toward meeting their Kyoto targets. This provides lower-cost emission reductions for 
developed countries and generates investment in clean development in developing countries.  
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exercise moral courage as it has been defined here. Although India is arguing for a 
mitigation system that focuses on equity, its representatives are not risking national 
interests. A system based on historical responsibility and/or development needs will 
certainly benefit the interests of India, China and other developing nations. Their position 
argues for more responsibility for climate change placed on the developed world, which 
would likely result in less stringent emission caps and/or mechanisms that would aid the 
developing countries reach their targets without sacrificing development. Even though 
the developing nations are making a sound ethical argument, they are not displaying true 
moral courage because they are not risking their nation’s interests for greater moral 
principles. We suggest that the ethical leaders among the delegates at the UNFCCC must 
emerge from developed nations that are willing to risk potential economic losses for the 
collective goal of mitigation and equity. 
A few researchers have informally alluded to the potential role of smaller 
developed nations as exemplars of climate justice. For example, Norway is proposed as a 
nation that is not known for its economic or military power but is recognized 
internationally as a nation with known for its good reputation, respect, culture, justice, 
and not to mention relative wealth due to its economy based on producing oil and natural 
gas. Norway is also broadly respected for its reputation in environmental protection, 
poverty alleviation and public health (Tao, 2012). In fact, it was the Prime Minister of 
Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, who led the 1987 World Commission on Environment 
and Development report entitled “Our Common Future”, which notably defined the 
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concept of sustainable development
7
 for the world (United Nations, 1987). In Durban, 
Norway allied with Australia and put forth a proposal that would place binding mitigation 
commitments on the developed world, saying that they should be “held accountable” to 
the emissions outcome of their targets; but developing nations would “only be bound to 
implement their actions, not the specific emissions outcome” (Parkinson, 2011). If 
countries like Norway, who risk significant economic losses to its oil and natural gas 
economy, altruistically support binding emission reduction proposals with considerations 
of equity, other developed nations with analogous risks may be persuaded to follow suit.  
Another glimmer of ethical leadership may be found among Scotland’s leaders. 
Scotland passed a tough climate change law recently that requires a 42% cut in GHG 
emissions by 2020, rising to 80% by 2050 (BBC News, 2009). When the legislation 
passed, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth told the 
Parliamentarians that passing the law was justified because climate change impacts all 
people and that they had a duty to make the commitment (Brown, 2009). Donald Brown 
of ClimateEthics.org reported statements by several Parliamentarians in support of the 
legislation. For example, Steward Stevenson, Minister for Transport, Infrastructure, and 
Climate Change, said: 
"The bill is not an economic bill, although it will have economic effects. It 
is not legislation to gather dust on the shelves of hundreds of lawyers; it is 
a moral step we take that will be important for the world. ... part of what 
we are doing is making a moral case on behalf of nations that will be more 
adversely affected by climate change than Scotland will be, such as those in 
sub-Saharan Africa, in particular. There is a moral as well as a practical 
imperative to what we are doing." (Brown, 2009) 
                                                 
7
 The term 'sustainable development' was used by the Brundtland Commission which coined what has 
become the most often-quoted definition of sustainable development as development that "meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (United 
Nations 1987). 
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Unfortunately, Norway and Scotland and other small countries that might be able 
to facilitate cooperation through modeled ethical leadership are not specifically 
mentioned, nor are their leaders acknowledged, in most accounts of the Durban 
meetings. If they are speaking up, they are being overshadowed by countries and 
alliances like the EU, India, China, and the US.  
 
Implications for International Cooperation 
 
Recounting the debates between the key international players in Durban (i.e., US, 
EU, China, and India) provides little hope of ever designing an effective yet equitable 
international mitigation system. In particular the EU’s position is perceived to be in 
contradiction to the demands of India, China, and other developing nations. However, 
when we look at nations that are concerned with designing a system centered on issues of 
responsibility, equity and justice, the resolution of the problem seems consistent. 
Specifically, the arguments by India, China and other developing countries (that equity 
remains the basis for Kyoto’s predecessor) are the same justifications that both leaders of 
Norway and Scotland argue for. Specifically, there is a general consensus between the 
morally minded nations that call for emission reduction targets by all nations (except 
maybe the least developed nations of the world) while including considerations of 
different levels of obligations based on historical contribution and current capacities of 
nations. When viewed from this perspective there doesn’t seem to be such a strong 
North/South divide. Instead the debate seems to be between those who acknowledge 
climate change as a moral issue (and seek to actively address it) and others who approach 
the problem in terms of economic and/or political feasibility. 
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An analogy can be made between the role that ethical leaders played in achieving 
cooperation in our game experiments and the potential role that exemplary ethical 
leadership by countries like Norway and Scotland could play in influencing collective 
action between nations. In order to influence the outcome of negotiations, the leaders of 
Scotland and Norway (and other potential ethical leaders that are committed to 
mitigation, despite risking their domestic interests) must employ moral courage and 
emerge from their current alliances as exemplars of ethical action. This will mean taking 
a much more active role and strong stand at upcoming conferences that may persuade 
other nations through their nation’s exemplary actions. If we are lucky, displays of moral 
courage by these smaller developed nations will begin to bridge the gap between emitters 
at all development levels. 
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